Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act by Lash, Kurt T.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2018
Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original
Relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment
and the 1866 Civil Rights Act
Kurt T. Lash
University of Richmond, klash@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Fourteenth Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights
Act, 106 Geo. L.J. 1389 (2018).
Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original
Relationship Between the Fourteenth Amendment
and the 1866 Civil Rights Act
KURT T. LASH*
For more than a century, legal scholars have looked to the 1866 Civil
Rights Act for clues regarding the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because the 1866 version of the Act protected only citizens
of the United States, most scholars believe that the Act should be used as
a guide to understanding the Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship-based
Privileges or Immunities Clause. A closer look at the original sources,
however, reveals that the 1866 Civil Rights Act protected rights then
associated with the requirements of due process. John Bingham, the man
who drafted Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, expressly
described the 1866 Civil Rights Act as protecting the natural and equal
right to due process in matters relating to life, liberty, and property.
Believing that Congress at that time lacked the constitutional power
to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Bingham
proposed a Fourteenth Amendment that expressly protected every per-
son's right to due process and granted Congress the power to enforce
the same. Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress repassed the Civil Rights Act and extended the majority of its
protections to "all persons." This final version of the Civil Rights Act
cannot be viewed as an enforcement of the rights of citizenship.
Instead, it links the Civil Rights Act to the Due Process Clause and to
the rights of all persons.
Understanding the link between the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the
1868 Due Process Clause sheds important light on the original mean-
ing of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, it suggests that
scholars have erred in trying to use the Civil Rights Act as a guide for
understanding the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Although citizens enjoyed the equal rights of person and prop-
erty protected by the Act, such enjoyment was only because all persons
held such due process-related rights. The particular Privileges or
* E. Claiborne Robins Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.
0 2018, Kurt T. Lash. The author thanks Lawrence Solum, Randy Barnett, John Harrison, Jeff
Pojanowski, Hank Chambers, and Kevin Walsh for their helpful comments on various drafts of the
Article. I am especially grateful for the suggestions and encouraging words by participants at the
London Roundtable on Constitutional Interpretation (hosted by Notre Dame Law School),
the University of Richmond Law School faculty colloquium, and the University of San Diego's
Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference. Finally, a special
thanks to Elizabeth Farrington for her research and editorial assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
1389
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 106:1389
Immunities of Citizens of the United States involved a different cate-
gory of rights-rights that men like John Bingham and Jacob Howard
identified as those actually enumerated in the Constitution. Second,
understanding the link between the Civil Rights Act and the 1868 Due
Process Clause reveals an underappreciated equal rights principle
within both the federal Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. This principle not only appropri-
ately informs due process constraints on federal activity in places like
the District of Columbia, but it also implicates broad congressional
power to enforce the equal due process rights of all persons in the
states regardless of citizenship.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long looked to the 1866 Civil Rights Act for clues to the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both legal documents were drafted and
passed within weeks of each other by the same members of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress and both involve the protection of individual rights against state abridg-
ment.' Congress also repassed the Civil Rights Act following the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment,2 suggesting that Congress understood that the
Amendment gave it the power to pass the Act.
What remains unclear, however, is exactly which provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment provided the power to pass legislation like the 1866 Civil Rights
Act. The Amendment itself is five sections long. Section One contains multiple
provisions, beginning with a definition of citizenship, followed by the protection
of the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," and ending with
a declaration that all persons are to be protected in their rights of due process and
the equal protection of the law.3
To date, most scholars assume that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended the Privileges or Immunities Clause to retroactively constitutionalize
the 1866 Civil Rights Act.4 Many of these same scholars believe the framers
intended the 1866 Civil Rights Act to enforce the "privileges and immunities of
1. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (vetoed by President Johnson); J. Res. 48, 39th
Cong. (1866) (enacted).
2. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
4. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 389-90 (2005); RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LosT CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 60 (2004); RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-51
(1977); CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIvIL RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE
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citizens in the several states" as described by Justice Bushrod Washington in the
antebellum case Corfield v. Coryell.i If correct, this view suggests that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause nationalized a host of "fundamental" property
and economic rights, as well as the right "to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety."6
A closer look at the original sources, however, suggests that the 1866 Civil
Rights Act is best understood as an attempt to protect the due process rights of all
persons, and not the special privileges or immunities of United States citizens.
Throughout the congressional debates, members linked rights protected under the
Civil Rights Act with rights traditionally associated with the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. According to James Wilson, the Bill's sponsor in the House
ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 44 (2015); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 118 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1230 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: What's So
Wicked About Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 325, 332-33 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea
Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1410 (2012); James W. Fox,
Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five
Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 96-97 (2002); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1474 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 960-61 (1995); Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a
Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207, 228 (2003); Note, Congress's Power to Define the Privileges and
Immunities of Citizenship, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1206, 1222 (2015); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 93, 97 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting). But see Philip Hamburger, Privileges or
Immunities, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 61, 123 (2011) (stating that the Civil Rights Act was "the precursor to
the Amendment's clauses on due process and equal protection").
5. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230); see AMAR, supra note 4, at 391; AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 174-80 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS]; BARNETT, supra note 4, at 60-68; BERGER, supra, note 4, at 22; MICHAEL KENT
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74
(1986); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW: THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 223, 231-32 (1965); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 72 (2011); Harrison, supra note 4, at 1416; Robert J. Kaczorowski,
The Supreme Court and Congress's Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral
Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 217-18 (2004); Lee Kovarsky, Prisoners and Habeas Privileges
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 VAND. L. REV. 609, 634 (2014); Alexander Tsesis, Gender
Discrimination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1657 n.69 (2012); Kyle
Alexander Casazza, Note, Inkblots: How the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause
Protect Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383, 1412-15 (2007); see also 2
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1934-37 (Thomas M.
Cooley ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1873).
6. According to Justice Washington:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and pos-
sess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right
of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agri-
culture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to
institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid
by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and
immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed
to be fundamental[.]
Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
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of Representatives, the Civil Rights Act protected the due process rights of life,
liberty, and property as originally declared in the Declaration of Independence
and constitutionalized by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. John
Bingham, the man who framed Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment,
expressly described the 1866 Civil Rights Act as an effort to enforce the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Bingham refused to support the Bill, how-
ever, due to his belief that Congress lacked the power to enforce any provision in
the Bill of Rights. Rather than supporting what he viewed as an unconstitutional
Act, Bingham instead proposed a constitutional amendment that both protected
the due process rights of all persons and empowered Congress to protect the
same. Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham joined
his colleagues in repassing the Civil Rights Act-this time with an additional pas-
sage that extended the majority of its protections to all persons regardless of citi-
zenship. This extension cannot be understood as an enforcement of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause-a clause that protects only the rights of citizens. Instead,
Bingham and the sponsors of the Act would have understood it as protecting the
fundamental rights of all persons-rights consistently described throughout the
Thirty-Ninth Congress as essential to the enjoyment of due process.
Understanding the 1866 Civil Rights Act as a due process statute requires
rethinking a number of commonly held views about the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the original understanding of Section One. Although members
commonly cited Corfield's list of equally-protected common law rights during
the debates on the Civil Rights Act, these rights would not have been transformed
into substantive rights by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Instead, such
rights would have been viewed as aspects of due process under which all persons
could expect equal protection. Although citizens also enjoy the rights of due pro-
cess, they do so because they are persons, not because they are citizens. This
explains why commentators at the time described the 1866 Civil Rights Act as
protecting both the rights of citizens of the United States and as protecting the
natural due process rights of all persons.
The historical understanding of the Due Process Clause as granting Congress
power to repass (and extend) the Civil Rights Act also casts significant light on
the Reconstruction-era understanding of due process. Mid-nineteenth century re-
publican theory viewed all persons as having an equal natural right to due pro-
cess. This explains why Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress viewed an
equal rights statute like the Civil Rights Act as enforcing the principles included
in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Thus, even without the language
in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Amendment's
Due Process Clause guarantees all persons an equal right to a minimum set of
procedural protections for persons and property. The separate language in the
Equal Protection Clause could be read as either clarifying the equal protection
principle inherent in Due Process or, as some scholars suggest, requiring the
equal enforcement of laws already on the books as protecting the due process
rights of whites.
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Understanding the link between the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 1868 Due
Process Clause provides insight as to the original meaning of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It not only reveals an underappreciated equal rights
strain within the Due Process Clause, but it also suggests scholars have been look-
ing in the wrong place for the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Rather than protecting the natural equal rights of all persons, this clause appears
to protect the constitutionally enumerated rights of American citizens, such as
those enumerated in the first eight amendments. These rights were now to be
applied against state officials with new federal power to secure their adequate
enforcement.
Part I of this Article explores the legal and political context of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, the body responsible for passing the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although divided into radical, moderate, and conserva-
tive camps, most Republicans shared the antebellum abolitionist view that all per-
sons were entitled to the equal rights of due process. As Republicans began to
realize the former confederate states had no intention of respecting such rights,
members searched for possible sources of constitutional authority to secure equal
civil rights in the South. Republicans first attempted to extend and expand the ju-
risdiction of the Freedmen's Bureau. In a series of debates, Republicans sought to
protect the same rights that would ultimately be protected by the Civil Rights
Act. The debates provide the first indication that members of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress viewed these civil rights through the lens of due process.
Part II investigates the drafting and passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Although the initial draft secured equal civil rights for all persons, moderate
Republicans' more limited view of congressional power forced advocates to limit
the Act's protections to "citizens"-a group more plausibly under Congress's
protective powers. Despite the change, advocates continued to describe the Bill
as protecting natural due process rights belonging to all persons. Having already
proposed an amendment authorizing congressional enforcement of the Due
Process Clause, John Bingham refused to support the Civil Rights Act. Bingham
not only objected that Congress lacked power to enforce the rights of due process,
but he also criticized Congress's failure to extend these rights to all persons.
Bingham's objections to the Civil Rights Act illuminate the theory behind his
chosen language for the final draft of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part III focuses on John Bingham's proposed Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Having opposed the Civil Rights Act, Bingham successfully advo-
cated passage of a constitutional amendment that bound the states to respect the
rights of due process and granted Congress authority to enforce due process
rights. According to Jacob Howard, the "all persons" provisions of Section One
(providing due process and equal protection) ensured the invalidation of discrimi-
natory "codes" in the South-codes that were the central target of the Civil
Rights Act. Following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
repassed the Civil Rights Act, this time extending the majority of its provisions to
all persons. Described as an effort to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the
1394 [Vol. 106:1389
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Civil Rights Act's extension to all persons cannot be understood as an enforce-
ment of the Privileges or Immunities of citizens. Instead, the extension conforms
with preratification accounts of the Civil Rights Act as an effort to secure the
equal due process rights of all persons.
Part IV considers some of the implications of this history and some likely
objections. In particular, the history suggests the need to rethink the com-
monly assumed link between the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. Although the equal rights of
due process would have been considered one of the privileges or immunities
of citizenship, this is because citizens were persons covered by both the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clauses. Such equal rights were
not triggered by citizenship status but by the mere fact of personhood. When
the Supreme Court in cases like Bolling v. Sharpe' identified an equality prin-
ciple in the concept of due process, the Court merely echoed an idea broadly
accepted by the Reconstruction Congress.
A QUICK WORD ABOUT METHODOLOGY
This Article explores the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
places it within the general category of contemporary originalist scholarship.
Despite the varying approaches to Originalism as a method of textual interpreta-
tion, its basic parameters are clear. The method asserts that the meaning of a text
is fixed at the time of its creation and that this meaning can be recovered through
an investigation of common historical usage of words and legal terms.
Originalists believe this meaning should have some constraining effect for con-
temporary judicial application of the text.8 The degree to which this recovered
understanding ought to bind contemporary courts depends on one's normative
theory of constitutional law.
In this Article, I make no claim about normative theory. Instead, I presume that
the original communicative content of the Fourteenth Amendment and related
legal texts is of interest to all constitutional scholars and to any judge considering
the historical roots of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
and the Reconstruction-era understanding of due process. Although this Article
pays particular attention to congressional debates, this does not reflect an embrace
of "framers' intent" originalism. The focus merely reflects (1) the commonly
accepted idea that such debates are relevant to determining common understand-
ings of legal terms and phrases, and (2) the need to address commonly held, but
likely erroneous, scholarly assertions about the views and intentions of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress.
7. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
8. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453,
460 (2013).
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I. THE LEGAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS
To understand the communicated meaning of words and phrases at the time of
Reconstruction, it is necessary to first understand the Reconstruction era in histor-
ical context. When the Thirty-Ninth Congress met in late December 1865, the
nation remained in shock over the April assassination of Abraham Lincoln and
members of Congress were slowly getting to know Lincoln's successor, Andrew
Johnson. The December celebration of a ratified Thirteenth Amendment was tem-
pered by a growing realization in Congress that southern legislatures were
attempting to entrench the inferior status of freedmen through the enactment of
the infamous "Black Codes." As Congress debated the need for further legislative
efforts on behalf of the freedmen, they did so surrounded by empty seats-daily
reminders of the still-excluded representatives from the rebellious southern
states.9 Both the House and the Senate were divided into various camps, each
with its own view about how to establish national freedom and how to restore a
functioning Union.
A. RADICAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND MODERATE REPUBLICANS IN THE THIRTY-NINTH
CONGRESS
Historians commonly divide the Reconstruction Congress into three camps:
radical, moderate, and conservative.o The terms are not meant to be pejorative-
indeed, the members themselves often were proud of being associated with
one or another camp." In this Article, I continue to use these three terms both
to maintain a common conversation with contemporary historians and because
I agree that the labels are helpful in keeping track of influential voting blocs in
the Reconstruction Congress. As we shall see, securing sufficient votes for
passing legislation or constitutional amendments often required negotiation
among the three camps, with the moderates often controlling legislative
outcomes.
The members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were unified in their common
desire to craft a successful policy of reconstruction and readmission of the
9. See WLLIAM H. BARNES, HISTORY OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 17-
21 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1868). For a full account of the exclusion, see David P. Currie, The
Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 385-90 (2008).
10. See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 4 & n.5 (1999); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 228-43 (1988) (describing and distinguishing "radical" and
"moderate" Republicans). See generally HANS L. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS: LINCOLN'S
VANGUARD FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1968).
11. THE POSITION OF THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A WHITE
REPUBLICAN AND A COLORED CITIZEN 1-2 (Washington, Union Republican Cong. Comm. 1868)
("Q: What is the meaning of the word Radical as applied to political parties and politicians? A: It means
one who is in favor of going to the root of things; who is thoroughly in earnest; who desires that slavery
should be abolished, that every disability connected therewith should be obliterated . . . . Q: Is Mr.
Sumner a Republican? A: He is and a Radical, so are Thad. Stevens, Senator Wilson, Judge Kelley, Gen.
Butler, Speaker Colfax, Chief Justice Chase, and all other men who favor giving colored men their
rights.").
1396 [Vol. 106:1389
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southern states. They were deeply divided, however, on how to accomplish that
goal. Radical Republicans favored continued exclusion of the former-confederate
states. 12 Radicals like Charles Sumner believed that the states committed "sui-
cide" and became no more than federal territories when they seceded from the
Union, thus allowing the victorious Union to combine and reconfigure the south-
em "territories" at will.13 At the very least, radicals insisted, proper republican
governments must be constructed in the southern states prior to their readmission
to the Union. Accordingly, radicals objected to including the votes of southern
states in determining the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment;14 in their
view, there were no southern states until Congress said so. Radicals also shared
an expansive vision of federal authority to enforce common law civil rights in the
states and they rejected more traditional ideas of divided national and state
authority."
At the other extreme, conservative Republicans (and most loyal Demo-
crats) believed that the Union should be reconstructed as quickly as possible.
This required the immediate readmission of the southern states following
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. If, as President Johnson insisted,
the southern states had the authority to vote for a constitutional amendment,
there was no longer any valid reason to exclude them from their seats in
the federal Congress.1 6 Conservatives shared a narrow reading of national
power, and they insisted that the general subject of civil rights should be left
to the people in the several states-as had been the case under the original
Constitution.
Moderate Republicans took, as one might expect, a middle view. They agreed
with radicals that no former-rebel state should be readmitted prior to guaranteeing
the rights of freedmen.1 7 However, moderates rejected radical theories of state-
suicide, and they held a far more modest view of existing congressional power to
regulate civil rights in the states. Most moderates continued to believe in the
12. FONER, supra note 10, at 232.
13. Id.
14. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND
RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869, at 142 (1974). This idea carried over into the debates surrounding the
Fourteenth Amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 384 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Farnsworth) ("In my judgment, three fourths of the States which were not in the rebellion are sufficient.
I do not see how a State which has been in the rebellion can act on the Constitution. I do not see how a
State which has abolished its State government as a part of the United States, and has been acting in
open hostility to the Government-I do not see how such a State can have submitted to its Legislature a
proposition for ratification.").
15. See FONER, supra note 10, at 230. The radicals' broad interpretation of national power is best
represented by the radical Republican view that Congress enjoyed unenumerated power to enforce civil
rights in the states, with or without the addition of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. See
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1480 (1864) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
16. See James M. Campbell & Rebecca J. Fraser, Introduction to RECONSTRUCTION: PEOPLE AND
PERSPECTIVES, at xv (James M. Campbell & Rebecca J. Fraser eds., Peter C. Mancall Series ed., 2008).
17. See Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the
Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 305-07 (2015).
2018] 1397
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 106:1389
liberty-enhancing value of federalism, even as they sought to protect a basic set
of national rights.1
B. THE DUE PROCESS CRITIQUE OF SLAVERY
One area of substantial overlap in the beliefs of Reconstruction Republicans
was their common belief that no person should be denied life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.1 9 On this matter, Republican thinking was deeply
influenced by antebellum abolitionist critiques of slavery. For decades, abolition-
ists had insisted that slavery was inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.20 Even if one accepted the Supreme Court's announcement in
18. See KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVLEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 80-81 (2014); see also EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 34-35 (1990).
19. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 290 (1970); MALTZ, supra note 18, at 4.
20. See JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY:
TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, IN RELATION TO THAT
SUBJECT 120 (1849) ("But there are other guaranties for freedom, to be found in that instrument, which
cannot be realized while slavery is permitted in the Union. Nevertheless, they stand there, as fresh and
imparative as they did the day they were made. Among others, is to be found the following; in the latter
clause of the 5th article of the amendments to the constitution, 'No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."'); see also FONER, supra note 19, at 133 ("[T]he
resolutions regarding slavery were fundamentally the same as they had been in 1856. Framed by John A.
Kasson, the former Massachusetts Free Soiler who now lived in Iowa, the platform declared that slavery
could not constitutionally exist in any territory because of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment."); ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY: WITH A PROPOSAL FOR THE
GRADUAL ABOLITION OF IT, IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 49-51 (1796) ("Civil rights, we may remember,
are reducible to three primary heads; the right of personal security; the right of personal liberty; and the
right of private property. In a state of slavery the two last are wholly abolished, the person of the slave
being at the absolute disposal of his master; and property, what he is incapable, in that state, either of
acquiring, or holding, to his own use. Hence it will appear how perfectly irreconcilable a state of slavery
is to the principles of a democracy, which form the basis and foundation of our government. For our bill
of rights declares, 'that all men are, by nature equally free and independent, and have certain rights of
which they cannot deprive or divest their posterity-namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property.' This is indeed no more than a recognition of the first
principles of the law of nature, which teaches us this equality, and enjoins every man, whatever
advantages he may possess over another, as to the various qualities or endowments of body or mind, to
practice the precepts of the law of nature to those who are in these respects his inferiors, no less than it
enjoins his inferiors to practise them towards him.... It would be hard to reconcile reducing the Negroes
to a state of slavery to these principles, unless we first degrade them below the rank of human beings, not
only politically, but also physically and morally."); WLLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF
ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 252-53 (1977) ("In 1837, Elizur Wright
and an anonymous black abolitionist used due process arguments to condemn the federal Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793. At the same time, at the annual convention of the N-EA-SS, a range of radical opinion
surfaced: William Goodell claimed vaguely that slavery was 'unlawful'; Nathaniel Colver, a
Massachusetts clerical abolitionist, argued that the Constitution did not recognize any right of
slaveholding; and the Reverend Orange Scott went all the way: 'The whole system of slavery is
unconstitutional, null and void, and the time is coming when the Judges of the land will pronounce it so.
So far from the Constitution authorizing or permitting slavery, it was established to guard life, liberty,
and property."' (footnotes omitted)).
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Dred Scott v. Sandford that blacks were not citizens,21 no one could reasonably
deny that blacks were persons.
The abolitionist reliance on the Fifth Amendment has been extensively cata-
logued and discussed by other scholars.22 For our purposes, it is important only to
note that abolitionists commonly read the federal Due Process Clause as a consti-
tutionalized expression of the Declaration of Independence-a foundational
document that declared the fundamental natural rights of all persons, not just
American citizens. As the 1843 Liberty Party Platform Declared:
RESOLVED, That the fundamental truths of the Declaration of Independence,
that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights,
among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, was made the fun-
damental law of our national government, by that amendment of the constitu-
tion which declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.23
In 1859, abolitionist Joel Tiffany published his Treatise on the Unconstitution-
ality of Slavery which explained that, among other guarantees of freedom found in
the Constitution "is to be found the following; in the latter clause of the 5th article
of the amendments to the constitution, 'No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. "24 The former slave turned statesman
Frederick Douglass likewise agreed that slavery could not be reconciled with the
due process guarantees of the federal Constitution:
This, I undertake to say, as the conclusion of the whole matter, that the con-
stitutionality of slavery can be made out only by disregarding the plain and
common-sense reading of the Constitution itself . . . . The Constitution
declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; it secures to every man the right of trial by jury, the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus-the great writ that put an end to slavery
and slave-hunting in England-it secures to every State a republican form of
government. Any one of these provisions, in the hands of abolition states-
men, and backed up by a right moral sentiment, would put an end to slavery
in America.25
21. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426-27 (1857).
22. See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 20, at 249-75; Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The
Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165 (2011); Maltz, supra note
17; Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to
Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951); Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
23. 1843 Platform of the Liberty Party, Adopted in Convention, 30 August 1843, Buffalo, N.Y.,
http://alexpeak.com/twr/libertyparty/1843/ [https://perma.cc/8DAE-7QAT].
24. TIFFANY, supra note 20, at 120.
25. Frederick Douglass, "The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery?"
(1860), in ANTISLAVERY POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1833-1860: A READER 153-54 (C. Bradley Thompson
ed., 2004).
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Finally, the Republican Party Platform of 1860 declared:
[T]hat as our republican fathers ... ordained that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law .... we deny the author-
ity of the Congress, of a territorial legislature, of any individual or association
of individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United
States ... .26
The precise content and scope of due process during the antebellum and
Reconstruction period remains a matter under scholarly dispute.27 Whatever
disagreement may have existed at the margins, however, there was clear con-
sensus among abolitionists and antebellum Republicans regarding its core
meaning: First, all persons had an equal right to due process (not just citi-
zens).28 Second, the rights of due process prohibited, at least, deprivation of
life, liberty, or property except by way of a judicially enforced set of fair proce-
dures. For example, in striking down the Fugitive Slave Act for violating the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Wisconsin Supreme Court Judge
Abram D. Smith declared:
The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. This last phrase has a distinct technical
meaning, viz: regular judicial proceedings, according to the course of the
common law, or by a regular suit commenced and prosecuted according
26. Platforms of 1856: Republican Platform, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS OF THE UNITED
STATES PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ELECTORAL AND POPULAR VOTES 28, 28 (J.M.H. Frederick comp.,
1896).
27. See, e.g., LASH, supra note 18; Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1675 (2012); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist
Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth
Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 588 (2009); McConnell, supra note 4, at 952-53; Ryan C. Williams,
Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 496 (2013) [hereinafter
Williams, Other Desegregation Decisions]; Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 428-59 (2010) [hereinafter Williams, The One and Only].
28. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("I have never
doubted that, on the adoption of that amendment, it would be competent for Congress to protect every
person in the United States in all the rights of person and property belonging to a free citizen"); id. at
158 (statement of Rep. Bingham) ("[E]very loyal citizen of this Republic has come to know, that the
divinest feature of your Constitution is the recognition of the absolute equality before the law of all
persons, whether citizens or strangers .... The President, therefore, might well say, as he does say in his
message, that 'the American system rests on the assertion of the equal right of EVERY MAN to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; to freedom of conscience, to the culture and exercise of all his
faculties."'); id. at 1090 (statement of Rep. Bingham) ("Is it not essential to the unity of the people that
the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States? Is it not essential to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people that all persons,
whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in this Union in
the rights of life and liberty and property?"); see also CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 140
(1857) (statement of Rep. Bingham) ("The Constitution provides ... that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. It makes no distinction either on account of
complexion or birth .... This is equality.").
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to the forms of law."29
Representative John Bingham (R-OH), the man who drafted the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, was particularly committed to the idea that
all persons had an equal right to due process. In an 1862 speech advocating abol-
ishing slavery in the District of Columbia, Bingham compared the Magna
Charta's due process for "freedmen" with the American Constitution's due pro-
cess for all "persons":
Sir, our Constitution, the new Magna Charta, which the gentleman aptly says
is the greatest provision for the rights of mankind and for the amelioration of
their condition, rejects in its bill of rights the restrictive word "freeman," and
adopts in its stead the more comprehensive words "no person;" thus giving its
protection to all, whether born free or bond. The provision of our Constitution
is, "no person shall be deprived of life, or liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law." This clear recognition of the rights of all was a new gospel to
mankind, something unknown to the men of the thirteenth century ... . the
patriots of America proclaimed the security and protection of law for all. The
later and nobler revelation to our fathers was that all men are equal before
the law. No matter upon what spot of the earth's surface they were born; no
matter whether an Asiatic or African, a European or an American sun first
burned upon them; no matter whether citizens or strangers; no matter whether
rich or poor; no matter whether wise or simple; no matter whether strong or
weak, this new Magna Charta to mankind declares the rights of all to life and
liberty and property are equal before the law; that no person, by virtue of the
American Constitution, by the majesty of American law, shall be deprived of
29. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 41 (1854); see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1480 (1864)
(statement of Sen. Sumner) (citation omitted):
This was a part of the amendments to the Constitution proposed by the First Congress, under the
popular demand for a Bill of Rights. Brief as it is, it is in itself alone a whole Bill of Rights. Liberty
can be lost only by "due process of law," words borrowed from the old liberty-loving common
law, illustrated by our master in law, Lord Coke. But it is best explained by the late Mr. Justice
Bronson, of New York, in a judicial opinion where he says:
"The meaning of the section then seems to be, that no member of the State shall be disenfranchised
or deprived of any of his rights or privileges unless the matter shall be adjudged against him upon
trial had according to the course of common law. The words 'due process of law' in this place can-
not mean less than a prosecution or suit instituted and conducted according to the prescribed forms
and solemnities for ascertaining guilt or determining the title to property."
Such is the protection which is thrown by the Constitution over every "person," without distinction
of race or color, class or condition. There can be no doubt about the universality of this protection.
All, without exception, come within its scope. Its natural meaning is plain ....
Sumner's speech, titled No Property in Man was separately published in pamphlet form. See Charles
Sumner, Sen. of Mass., No Property in Man (Apr. 8, 1864), in LOYAL PUBL'N Soc'Y, PAMPHLETS ISSUED
BY THE LOYAL PUBLICATION SOCIETY, FROM FEB. 1, 1864, To FEB. 1, 1865: Nos. 45 To 78 (1865). As
much as abolitionist Republicans may have wished to enforce the federal Due Process Clause against the
states, the antebellum Supreme Court foreclosed this possibility by ruling that the Bill of Rights bound
only the federal government. In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833), Chief Justice
John Marshall ruled that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights,
did not bind state officials.
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life or liberty or property without due process of law. Unhappily, for about
sixty years this provision of the Constitution, hear upon the hearthstone of the
Republic, where the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States is
exclusive, without State limitations and subject to no restraint other than that
imposed by the letter and spirit of the Constitution, this sacred guarantee of
life and liberty and property to all has been wantonly ignored and disregarded
as to a large class of our natural-born citizens.3 0
By the time Congress debated the Thirteenth Amendment, the abolitionist link-
age of the natural rights of the Declaration and the equal right to due process was
well entrenched. On December 14, 1863, Representative Owen Lovejoy (R-IL)
"introduced a bill to give effect to the Declaration of Independence, and also to
certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States."3 1 As reported in the
Congressional Globe:
[Lovejoy's] bill was read. It recite[d] that all men were created equal, and
were endowed by the Creator with the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the
fruits of honest toil; that the Government of the United States was instituted to
secure those rights; that the Constitution declares that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law, and also provides-article 5,
clause 2-that "this Constitution, and the laws of the United States made in
pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in each
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution and laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding;" that it is now demonstrated by the rebellion
that slavery is absolutely incompatible with the union, peace, and general wel-
fare, for which Congress is to provide. It therefore enacts that all persons here-
tofore held in slavery in any of the States or Territories of the United States are
declared free men, and are forever released from slavery or involuntary servi-
tude, except as punishment for crime, on due conviction.32
As the debates went forward on the proposed Thirteenth Amendment, other
members also linked the Declaration of Independence with the Due Process
Clause and declared both violated by slavery. As Sen. Charles Sumner (R-MA)
explained:
[N]o American need be at a loss to designate some of the distinctive elements
of a republic according to the idea of American institutions. These will be
found, first, in the Declaration of Independence, by which it is solemnly
announced "that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." And
they will be found, secondly, in that other guarantee and prohibition of the
Constitution, in harmony with the Declaration of independence; "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Such
30. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
31. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1863) (statement of Rep. Lovejoy).
32. Id. (reporter's account of the reading of the Bill).
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are some of the essential elements of a "republican form of government,"
which cannot be disowned by us without disowning the very muniments of our
liberties; and it is there which the United States are bound to guaranty. But all
these make slavery impossible.3 3
Although the final version of the Thirteenth Amendment spoke only of slavery
and involuntary servitude, every proponent understood the incompatibility of
slavery and the general protections of due process. Republicans embraced the ab-
olitionist critique of slavery and the idea that slaves, as persons, were denied the
due process protection of life, liberty, and property. Slavery thus conflicted with
the broadly accepted idea that the rights of due process were natural rights belong-
ing to all persons as originally announced in the Declaration of Independence.
Reconstruction-era Republicans agreed that abolishing slavery would remove an
impediment to the natural rights of all persons to due process in cases involving
the deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
What Republicans in 1864 did not agree on, however, was whether securing
these rights to the freedmen required something more than simply abolishing
slavery. Because laws in every state protected free persons' rights of life, liberty,
and property,3 4 it was possible that former slaves would automatically enjoy the
state-secured rights of free persons without the need for additional legislation.3 5
Some radical Republicans insisted that Congress go beyond eradicating slavery
and additionally secure the "equal rights" of all freedmen. Charles Sumner, for
example, criticized the final draft of the Thirteenth Amendment and urged his fel-
lows to adopt an antislavery amendment that specifically established that "[a]ll
persons are equal before the law."3 6 Despite Sumner's dogged efforts, the Thirty-
33. Id. at 1480 (statement of Sen. Sumner).
34. For a discussion of due process in state constitutions, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah
E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in
1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 65-67
(2008) ("Thirty states out of thirty-seven in 1868-or an Article V, three-quarters consensus-had
clauses in their state constitutions that explicitly prohibited the deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law or by the law of the land."). For examples of state constitutional provisions
protecting due process rights, see, for example, GA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 2 ("No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law."); Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 1
("That we hold it to be self-evident, that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights, among which are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of
happiness"); N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. I, § 2 ("All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent
rights. [A]mong which are-the enjoying and defending life and liberty-acquiring, possessing and
protecting property-and in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness."); N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, §
6 ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). Regardless
of constitutional provisions, every state had existing laws securing the general rights of life, liberty, and
property.
35. See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 133 (2001) ("[M]ost Republicans, even the radicals among them, did not
foresee a time when the clause would be invoked to increase federal power over the states. Instead, they
assumed that the states would apply the laws of freedom equally. Republicans who assumed that the
states would act responsibly may have been naive, but their assumption was nonetheless genuine.").
36. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1483 (1864) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
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Eighth Congress rejected his effort to both abolish slavery and secure equal
rights. As Senator Lyman Trumbull (R-IL) explained to Sumner, although the
committee had considered his proposal, the object of the amendment was "to
abolish slavery and prevent its existence hereafter. The language as reported by
the committee will accomplish these objects . . . ."3 If the southern states
accepted the amendment in good faith, freedmen would enjoy the status quo pro-
tections for free persons and nothing more would be required to secure to all per-
sons the natural rights of due process.
Even as ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment was pending before the
states, however, southern states moved to enact the infamous Black Codes. The
"first and most severe" codes were enacted near the end of 1865, just as the final
state ratifications triggered the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.38 The
new codes severely restricted the freedmen's ability to buy or rent property, con-
tract for labor, or testify in cases involving a dispute with a white employer.3 9
The few legal process laws that remained formally available to freedmen were of-
ten unenforced or unequally enforced.4 0
When the members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress first assembled in December
of 1865, a number of Republicans had already concluded that securing to freed-
men their natural rights of due process would require additional congressional
action. For these members, the difficulty became identifying a plausible source of
constitutional authority to protect the rights of person and property.
C. THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU BILL
The debates over the Freedmen's Bureau Extension Bill are an underappreci-
ated source of information about the underlying theory of the original (and ulti-
mate) Civil Rights Act. Introduced at the same time as the Civil Rights Bill, the
Freedmen's Bill protected the same set of rights as the Act.41 Proponents initially
37. Id. at 1488 (statement of Sen. Trumbull). Scholars occasionally argue that Congress did not
actually reject Sumner's proposal for an expansive equal rights amendment, and that the final language
of the Thirteenth Amendment could be understood as guaranteeing everything Sumner wanted. This is
unlikely. Members fully understood that Sumner wished to go beyond simply eradicating slavery.
Indeed, that had been Sumner's effort from the opening of the session. Doing so, however, would
guarantee losing the support of war-supporting Democrats who were just barely on board. The
Republican leadership understood this and turned aside Sumner's more radical efforts. It was only later,
after the Amendment had been ratified and it had become clear that states would not act in good faith,
that members like Trumbull and Howard unsuccessfully pressed for a Sumner-esque reading of the
Thirteenth Amendment. As Michael Vorenberg writes (in reference to this later "re-reading"):
"Obviously, there was some embellishment here, for committee members in 1864 could not have
envisioned all that southern state governments would do to undercut black freedom in 1865 and 1866. It
was understandable, then, that a number of lawmakers in 1866 did not accept Trumbull and Howard's
story." VORENBERG, supra note 35, at 55.
38. See FONER, supra note 10, at 199; see also ERIC L. McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND
RECONSTRUCTION 39 (1988).
39. See FONER, supra note 10, at 199-204.
40. See id. at 204-05.
41. See infra notes 43, 45 and accompanying text.
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described both bills as companion efforts to enforce the natural rights of all free
persons as authorized by Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.
On December 19, 1865, Senator Lyman Trumbull (R-IL) announced his inten-
tion to "introduce a bill to enlarge the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau so as to
secure freedom to all persons within the United States, and protect every individ-
ual in the full enjoyment of the rights of person and property and furnish him
with means for their vindication. "42 On January 5, 1866, Trumbull introduced
Senate Bills 60 and 61. Senate Bill 60, titled a bill "to enlarge the powers of the
Freedmen's Bureau," protected the following rights:
Whenever in any State or district in which the ordinary course of judicial pro-
ceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion, and wherein, in consequence of
any State or local law, ordinance, police, or other regulation, custom, or preju-
dice, any of the civil rights or immunities belonging to white persons (includ-
ing the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and estate) are refused or denied to negroes, mulattoes,
freedmen, refugees, or any other persons, on account of race, color, or any pre-
vious condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or wherein they or
any of them are subjected to any other or different punishment, pains, or penal-
ties, for the commission of any act or offense, than are prescribed for white
persons committing like acts or offenses, it is to be the duty of the President of
the United States, through the Commissioner, to extend military protection
and jurisdiction over all cases affecting such persons so discriminated
against.44
Senate Bill 61, titled an act "to protect all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication, "4 similarly provided:
[T]hat there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among
the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of
race, color, or previous condition of slavery; but the inhabitants of every race
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
42. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
43. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 129 (1866).
44. Id. at 209 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
45. Id. at 211 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." 6
As originally proposed, both bills protected the same list of rights and extended
these rights to all persons, not just citizens. Both bills required that the states
guarantee equal rights, but neither bill established a set of absolute substantive
rights. States could regulate (and deprive) the rights of liberty, property, and per-
sonal security so long as they did so in a nondiscriminatory manner with adequate
access to legal process (such as when the deprivation was "as punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" 47 ). Although neither bill
expressly referred to the rights of due process, as the debates went forward mem-
bers repeatedly linked the protections of the Bill to rights declared in the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
1. Debating the Freedmen's Bureau Bill in the Senate
When debate began in the Senate on the Freedmen's Bill on January 18, 1866,
members noted its obvious relationship to Civil Rights Bill. According to
William Stewart (R-NV):
I am in favor of this bill. It goes to the utmost extent that I think we are entitled
to go under the [Thirteenth] amendment. There is another bill introduced by
the Senator from Illinois [Trumbull] which must go along with it, which pro-
vides civil jurisdiction for the protection of the freedman. Under this constitu-
tional amendment we can protect the freedman and accomplish something for
his real benefit."8
Opponents of the Freedmen's Bill raised a number of objections, including that
it made the war-time Freedmen's Bureau permanent, extended its jurisdiction to
include freedmen in states that had never seceded from the Union, and exercised a
heretofore unheard of national power to purchase homes for local dependents.49
Most of all, opponents denied that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized enforce-
ment of the civil rights covered by either the Freedmen's Bill or the Civil Rights
Act. As Senator Thomas Hendricks (D-IN) argued:
I understand, from the remarks of the Senator who introduced this bill [Mr.
TRUMBULL], when he gave notice of its introduction, that he places the power
of Congress to enact this law under the amendment to the Constitution abolish-
ing slavery.
It is claimed that under [that Amendment's] second section Congress may do
anything necessary, in its judgment, not only to secure the freedom of the
46. Id.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
48. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1977 (1865) (statement of Sen. Stewart).
49. See id. at 315-17 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
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negro, but to secure to him all civil rights that are secured to white people. I
deny that construction, and it will be a very dangerous construction to adopt ....
What is slavery? ... [I]t is a relation between two persons whereby the conduct
of the one is placed under the will of the other ... . The law of the State which
authorized this relation is abrogated and annulled by this provision of the
Federal Constitution, but no new rights are conferred upon the freedman.
Then, sir, to make a contract is a civil right which has ordinarily been regulated
by the States. The form of that contract and the ceremonies that shall attend it
are not to be regulated by Congress, but by the States . . . . Is the right to marry
according to a man's choice a civil right? Marriage is a civil contract, and to
marry according to one's choice is a civil right ....
... [S]uppose a minister when called upon should refuse to solemnize a mar-
riage between a colored man and a white woman because the law of the State
forbade it, would he then, refusing to recognize a civil right which is enjoyed
by white persons, be liable to this punishment? 0
In response, Sen. Trumbull noted that the Freedmen's Bill should be viewed as
a continuation of all the power Congress had exercised during the war, for war
powers "do not cease with the dispersion of the rebel armies."" Trumbull's pri-
mary argument, however, was that the rights protected under both the Freedmen's
Bill and the Civil Rights Bill were authorized by the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment:
What was the object of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery? It
was not, as the Senator says, simply to take away the power of the master over
the slave. Did we not mean something more than that? Did we not mean that
hereafter slavery should not exist, no matter whether the servitude was claimed
as due to an individual or the State? The constitutional amendment abolishes
just as absolutely all provisions of State or local law which make a man a slave
as it takes away the power of his former master to control him.
... With the destruction of slavery necessarily follows the destruction of the
incidents to slavery. When slavery was abolished, slave codes in its support
were abolished also.
Those laws that prevented the colored man going from home, that did not
allow him to buy or sell, or to make contracts; that did not allow him to own
property; that did not allow him to enforce rights; that did not allow him to be
educated, were all badges of servitude made in the interest of slavery and as a
part of slavery.5 2
50. Id. at 318-19 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
51. Id. at 320 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
52. Id. at 322.
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According to Trumbull, both the Freedmen's Bill and the Civil Rights Bill
advanced the same policy as that advocated by President Johnson, who had
recently declared that "[t]he American system rests on the assertion of the equal
right of every man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to freedom of con-
science, to the culture and exercise of all his faculties."53 "The design of these
bills," Trumbull assured his colleagues, "is not, as the Senator from Indiana [Mr.
HENDRICKS] would have us believe, to consolidate all power in the Federal
Government, or to interfere with the domestic regulations of any of the States,
except so far as to carry out a constitutional provision which is the supreme law
of the land."5 4
Trumbull's invocation of the language of the Declaration of Independence in
support of a law protecting the rights of life, liberty, and property echoed the ante-
bellum abolitionist claim that slavery denied persons their natural rights to life,
liberty, and property-rights expressly declared in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
Trumbull's colleagues recognized the theory, but some questioned whether the
Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the power to enforce the rights of the Due
Process Clause." In fact, some argued that Trumbull's proposed legislation was
unnecessary precisely because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
already guaranteed all persons the rights of life, liberty, and property against state
abridgement. As Senator Edgar Cowan (R-PA) stated:
I have only to say that the Constitution of the United States makes provision
by which the rights of no free man, no man not a slave, can be infringed in so
far as regards any of the great principles of English and American liberty; and
if these things are done by authority of any of the southern States, there is
ample remedy now. Under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, no man
can be deprived of his rights without the ordinary process of law; and if he is,
he has his remedy.
Cowan's comments are significant for two reasons. First, they indicate that
Cowan understood that the purpose behind both the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and
the Civil Rights Bill was to enforce rights covered by the Due Process Clause.
Secondly, Cowan believed that the Fifth Amendment already provided individuals
53. Id. (quoting President Andrew Johnson's annual message to Congress).
54. Id. at 323. In discussing Congress's legislative efforts during the war, Trumbull claimed
Congress had relied on a number of texts in the Constitution, including the War Powers, the Comity
Clause, and the Republican Guarantee Clause. See id. at 319. Trumbull's references were not tied
specifically to either the Freedmen's Bill or the Civil Rights Bill. At this point in the debates (prior to the
alteration of the Civil Rights Bill), Trumbull cited only the Thirteenth Amendment as an equal source of
congressional authority for passing the two bills.
55. This was John Bingham's specific objection. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
56. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan).
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with a cause of action against state officials." This was a minority position, but it
stands as yet another example of the common understanding that the Bill sought
to enforce the rights of due process.
In addition to the frequent references to the Freedmen's Bill's protection of the
rights of due process, members also continually referred to the proposed Bill's
protection of the rights of all freedmen, regardless of citizenship. Senator Henry
Wilson (R-MA), for example, supported the Freedmen's Bill as one of a series of
measures "for the security, the liberty, and the protection of all people."5 1 When
challenged to define what he meant by the "equality of men" secured by the
Freedmen's and Civil Rights Bills, Wilson responded by describing the rights of
all persons to equal protection of the law:
Why are these questions put? ... Does he not know that we mean that the poor-
est man, be he black or white, that treads the soil of this continent, is as much
entitled to the protection of the law as the richest and the proudest man in the
land? Does he not know that we mean that the poor man, whose wife may be
dressed in a cheap calico, is as much entitled to have her protected by equal
law as is the rich man to have his jeweled bride protected by the laws of the
land? Does he not know that the poor man's cabin, though it may be the cabin
of a poor freedman in the depths of the Carolinas, is entitled to the protection
of the same law that protects the palace of a Stewart or an Astor?
... [W]e have accepted the sublime truths of the Declaration of Independence.
We stand as the champions of human rights for all men, black and white, the
59wide world over ....
Agreeing with Wilson's general description, Senator James McDougall (D-CA)
explained:
The provision of the constitutional amendment, now a part of the instrument,
authorizes Congress to pass any law in aid of its terms. What would be a law in
aid of it? A just and proper law in aid of it would be a law declaring that no
State legislation or legislation of Congress should be effective to deprive any
person, regardless of color, of his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit and
enjoyment of happiness; that every person shall be free, and that he shall be
protected, if you please.
The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WILSON] told us a day or two ago what
freedom meant; and he said it meant protection. Ay, sir, it does mean
57. Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), that
the Fifth Amendment did not bind the states, some members of the Reconstruction Congress either were
not aware of Barron or rejected its reasoning. See LASH, supra note 18, at 101.
58. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (1866) (statement of Sen. Wilson) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 343-44 (emphasis added).
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protection. Under all Governments that are free, freedom is perfect protection
in life, liberty, and the enjoyment and pursuit of happiness.60
Given the obvious relationship between the Freedmen's Bill and the Civil
Rights Act, opponents used the debates over the Freedmen's Bill to criticize both
proposals. Thus, even before debate on the Civil Rights Act had officially begun,
critics questioned whether Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment empow-
ered Congress to require states to equally protect the civil rights of all persons.6 1
Despite such objections, the Senate passed the Freedmen's Bureau Bill on
January 25 by a vote of 37-10.62 These criticisms, however, put proponents of the
Civil Rights Bill on notice that not every member shared a broad reading of the
Thirteenth Amendment. These dissenters might potentially block either Bill's
passage should Congress have to overcome a Presidential veto.
2. The House: Bingham's Proposed Amendment & Debating the Freedmen's
Bill
On December 6, 1865, Representative John Bingham (R-OH) proposed an
amendment that would empower Congress to pass "all necessary and proper laws
to secure to all persons in every State of the Union equal protection in their rights,
life, liberty, and property," which was then sent on to the Committee on the
Judiciary for consideration.6 3 On January 25, 1866, Bingham declared that the
question "whether the Constitution shall be so amended as to give to Congress
the power by statute law to enforce all its guarantees," was the most important
issue that would come before Congress.6 4
On February 13, Bingham, on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
referred the following proposed amendment to the House of Representatives:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States [Art. IV, Sec. 2]; and to all persons in the several
60. Id. at. 393 (statement of Sen. McDougall) (emphasis added). McDougall opposed the Freedmen's
Bill on the grounds that it went beyond the rights of equal protection and provided special positive rights
for the freedmen. Id.
61. According to Senator Willard Saulsbury (D-DE):
The authority to enact such a law is claimed under the second section of the act providing for the
amendment of the Constitution. Can it be possible that any person can conceive that under that sec-
tion such an extensive power as that now claimed is actually given? ... What was the amendment?
An amendment abolishing the status or condition of slavery, which is nothing but a status or condi-
tion which subjects one man to the control of another, and gives to that other the proceeds of the
former's labor. Cannot that amendment be carried into effect, and the status of freedom estab-
lished, without exercising such a power as this? I say here, as I have said before, that when that
constitutional amendment was under consideration in this Chamber, there was no friend of the
measure who claimed or avowed that such a power as this existed in Congress under it.
Id. at 363 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury) (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 421 (with the following members absent: Cowan, Nesmith, and Willey).
63. Id. at 14 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
64. Id. at 432.
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States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property [Fifth
Amendment].65
Note that the final clause in Bingham's proposed amendment guaranteed to all
persons the rights of due process. This was the first draft of what would become
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, Bingham would redraft
the amendment and secure its adoption following Congress's passage of the Civil
Rights Act.6 6 As we shall see, members referred to Bingham's proposed amend-
ment as the debates on the Freedmen's Bill and the Civil Rights Bill went
forward.
The House began debate on the Freedmen's Bill on January 30, 1866. Like in
the Senate, proponents of the Bill in the House spoke of its protection of the due
process rights of life, liberty, and property, except now they linked these ideas to
Rep. Bingham's proposed amendment. According to Representative Ignatius
Donnelly (R-MN):
There is an amendment offered by the distinguished gentleman from Ohio
[Mr. BINGHAM] which provides in effect that Congress shall have power to
enforce by appropriate legislation all the guarantees of the Constitution.
Why should this not pass? Are the promises of the Constitution mere verbiage?
Are its sacred pledges of life, liberty, and property to fall to the ground through
lack of power to enforce them?6 7
As we shall see, Bingham believed an amendment was necessary to supply
Congress with power to enforce the rights of due process. Proponents of the Bill,
however, insisted that Congress already possessed implied authority to pass the
Bill under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.6 8 Like in the Senate, how-
ever, opponents denied such an expansive reading of the abolition amendment.
As Representative Samuel Marshall (D-IL) argued:
65. Id. at 813. The proposed amendment was submitted to the Senate on the same day. See id. at 806.
66. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
67. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 586 (1866) (statement of Rep. Donnelly); see also id. at 540
(statement of Rep. Dawson) ("The constitutional provisions guarantying the liberties of the American
citizen are those contained in the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of the amendments. They secure him in
the possession of personal liberty and property, against unwarrantable search and seizure, and in the
right to a trial by jury. These are the American's birthright and the pillars which support our democratic
government."). Representative Donnelly's speech was separately published in pamphlet form. See
FREEDMAN'S BUREAU: SPEECH OF HON. IGNATIUS DONNELLY OF MINNESOTA: DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, FEBRUARY 1, 1866 (Washington, D.C., McGill & Witherow 1866). Note that
Donnelly understood that Bingham was trying to add an amendment that would enforce all
constitutionally enumerated rights. For more on Bingham's effort to secure constitutionally enumerated
rights, see LASH, supra note 18, at 81-96.
68. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 630 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hubbard) ("I commend to his
[Rep. Marshall's] careful study the spirit of the second section of that immortal amendment, and I think
if he will study it with a willingness to be convinced he will see that it has given to this Congress full
power in the premises.").
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I know some have pretended that Congress acquires the powers asserted in this
bill by virtue of the second clause of the amendment to the Constitution
recently adopted
Congress has power to enforce what? The abolition of slavery. This is not
denied. Slavery is abolished throughout the entire land. If any man asserts the
right to hold another in bondage as his slave, his chattel, and refuses to let him
go free, Congress can by law, under this clause, provide by appropriate legisla-
tion for the punishment of the offender and the protection from slavery of the
freedman. But Congress has acquired not a particle of additional power other
than this by virtue of this amendment."
These and similar objections, however, failed to dissuade a majority of the
House from voting for the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. On February 6, the House
voted in favor of the Freedmen's Bill.7 0
3. Initial Vote and President Johnson's Veto
After the House and Senate concurred on the final language, the Freedmen's
Bill was officially passed on February 13, 1866 and sent to President Johnson for
his signature. 71 To the surprise of almost everyone, Johnson vetoed the Bill.7 2
Reporting the Bill back to Congress, Johnson insisted that the Bill's protection of
undefined "civil rights and immunities" exceeded Congress's war powers.7 3
69. Id. at 628 (statement of Rep. Marshall); see also id. at 638 (statement of Rep. Shanklin) ("They
refer to the second section of the amendment to the Constitution. When the question of the ratification of
the amendment to the Constitution was up in my State, those who were opposed to it opposed it upon the
ground that it would be construed to give power to Congress to legislate on the subject. They told us our
suspicions were unfounded, and that the second section gave no such powers to the United States; that it
was only intended to carry out and secure to the negro his personal freedom, such as all the free negroes
then enjoyed; that they and the friends of the amendment was as much opposed to negro equality or
negro suffrage or to conferring the power on Congress to extending these privileges to the negro, as
those that opposed the amendment; that the section was not susceptible of any such construction. And
under that protest they induced thousands to vote for the amendment .... ); id. at 649 (statement of Rep.
Trimble) ("I was referred the other day by a distinguished gentleman on the opposite side that they
obtained [power to pass the bill] under the provision for the general welfare of the country, and under the
provision of the Constitution as recently amended, I believe known as the thirteenth article of the
amendments to the Constitution of the United States. But, sir, I have looked in vain to that amendment to
find a shadow of authority in it for the provisions of this bill."); id. at 934 (statement of Sen. Garret
Davis) ("[T]he second section of the last amendment of the Constitution is mostly relied upon by the
friends of this measure as conferring upon Congress the power to pass it. . . . The first section simply
abolishes slavery and involuntary servitude at that time, and inhibits them, prospectively, in the United
States and every place subject to their jurisdiction. It neither does nor attempts to do anything more.").
70. Id. at 688 (136-33, with 13 not voting).
71. See id. at 812.
72. See FONER, supra note 10, at 247.
73. In his veto message, Johnson wrote:
[T]he bill before me contains provisions which in my opinion are not warranted by the
Constitution, and are not well suited to accomplish the end in view.
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Johnson apparently did not consider the Thirteenth Amendment to be a plausible
enough source of power to be worth mentioning, much less debating.
Caught off guard, proponents scrambled to assemble the necessary votes to
override the President's veto. 74 Senator Trumbull exhorted his colleagues to "ful-
fill our duties as legislators by according equal and exact justice to all men,"75
and he insisted that Congress had constitutional authority to pass the Bill under
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. 76 His efforts were of no avail.
Although a Senate majority supported the Bill, Trumbull failed to secure the two-
thirds vote necessary to override a presidential veto.77 In the end, several mem-
bers who had originally supported the Bill refused to support the override.7 8
As other historians have noted, the initial failure of the Freedmen's Bill sig-
naled to the members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress a blunt political fact: no legis-
lative proposal was safe unless it was supported by a broad coalition of radical,
moderate, and conservative Republicans.79 Unless a stronger case could be made
in favor of the Civil Rights Act, the Bill faced the same fate as the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill.so
The subjects over which this military jurisdiction is to extend in every part of the United States
include protection to "all employes, agents, and officers of this bureau in the exercise of the duties
imposed" upon them by the bill. In eleven States it is further to extend over all cases affecting
freedmen and refugees discriminated against "by local law, custom, or prejudice." In those eleven
States the bill subjects any white person who may be charged with depriving a freedman of "any
civil rights or immunities belonging to white persons" to imprisonment or fine, or both, without,
however, defining the "civil rights and immunities" which are thus to be secured to the freedmen
by military law.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 916 (1866). In addition to being beyond the war powers authority of
Congress, Johnson also objected to making the freedmen the charges of the federal government and
passing a law affecting the southern states when those states remained excluded from Congress. Id. at
916-17.
74. See BENEDICT, supra note 14, at 164-65; MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL
OF ANDREW JOHNSON 12 (1999) (explaining that radical Republicans reacted with "frustrated outrage");
FONER, supra note 10, at 247; STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMAN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876, at 22 (1998) ("Trumbull expressed great surprise at the veto,
pointing out that the bill's purpose was to protect constitutional rights."); LASH, supra note 18, at 122;
McKITRICK, supra note 38, at 287-97.
75. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 936 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
76. See id. at 941-42.
77. The vote in the Senate was 30-18 in favor of the override (with two abstentions). Voting against
override were Sens. Buckalew, Cowan, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Guthrie, Hendricks, Johnson,
McDougall, Morgan, Nesmith, Norton, Riddle, Saulsbury, Stewart, Stockton, Van Winkle, and Willey
(18) (with Foot and Wright absent). See id. at 943. In passing the original act, only Buckalew, Davis,
Guthrie, Hendricks, Johnson, McDougall, Riddle, Saulsbury, Stockton, and Wright (10) had opposed
(with Cowan, Nesmith, and Willey absent). See id. at 421.
78. See MALTZ, supra note 18, at 49.
79. See id. at 60.
80. Later that summer, following the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed a
different version of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. This version narrowed the Bill's reach to citizens,
removed the language of "all civil rights and immunities as belong to whites" and instead listed
particular rights (the same as the Civil Rights Act), and added language limiting the enforcement power
to "such rights and immunities." Congress also removed the original Bill's provisions granting land to
the freedmen. See ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (1866).
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II. THE CIVIL RIGHTs BILL
The Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill were introduced on the
same day and contained identical lists of rights. 1 Proponents initially argued that
both Bills represented attempts to enforce Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment.82 Opponents rejected these arguments, insisting that neither the
drafters nor the ratifiers understood the text of the Thirteenth Amendment as
authorizing anything beyond congressional prohibitions relating to the formal sta-
tus of chattel slavery.83 After Johnson's veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, it
was clear that the President also had a narrow view of Section Two-something
that likely surprised no one given his administration's public assurances to the
ratifying states the previous fall.84
The fallback argument for the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was that it also repre-
sented a temporary exercise of Congress's war powers." There was no such argu-
ment available in support of the Civil Rights Bill. If a majority of members were
not convinced that this second bill represented an appropriate exercise of
Thirteenth Amendment power, then the Bill might fail. Even if passed by a ma-
jority, the Civil Rights Bill faced a potential veto by a doubting President, in
which case, proponents would have to convince a supermajority of their members
that the Bill was an appropriate exercise of congressional power. Proponents of
the Civil Rights Bill thus faced the difficult task of constructing a widely accepta-
ble theory of congressional power, one broad enough to authorize federal protec-
tion of the natural rights of all persons.
Radical Republicans, of course, needed little convincing. Many radicals were
less than committed to the idea of limited enumerated federal power in the first
place.86 Some claimed that the states had committed "suicide," thus triggering
plenary federal control of the southern "territories."87 These, however, remained
81. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
84. Concerned that Section Two of the proposed Thirteenth Amendment would empower Congress
to enforce the political and civil rights of the freedmen, the Provisional Governor of South Carolina
wired President Johnson for clarification of the Amendment's scope. See EDWARD MCPHERSON, A
POLITICAL MANUAL FOR 1866, at 22-23 (Washington, Phillip & Solomons 1866). He received the
following reply from Secretary of State William Seward: "The objection you mention to the last clause
of the constitutional amendment is regarded as querulous and unreasonable, because that clause is really
restraining in its effect, instead of enlarging the powers of Congress." Id. at 23. Apparently hoping to
make this the official construction of the Thirteenth Amendment, Florida, Alabama, and South Carolina
each placed in their official ratifications a statement that any congressional legislation upon the political
rights of former slaves would be contrary to the proposed amendment, just to make sure that the point
was beyond dispute. See 3 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 200-10, 217-20 (1901); see also Hon. D.S. Walker, Governor Elect, Inaugural Address (Dec.
20, 1865), in THE REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 15, 18-19
(Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1866) (quoting Seward's letter and calling on the legislature to trust
this assurance and ratify the Thirteenth Amendment).
85. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
86. See FONER, supra note 10, at 231-32.
87. Id. at 232.
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minority views. Most Republicans continued to believe that the states had never
legally left the Union in the first place, and most accepted the theory of limited
enumerated federal power.
To the extent that the effort required an enumerated power, radical
Republicans embraced a broad theory of congressional power to enforce Section
Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.89 Once again, however, their less-than-
radical colleagues held far more limited interpretations of national power in gen-
eral and of Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment in particular. Moderate
Republicans remained committed to constitutional federalism and the idea that,
even after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Constitution left local
"civil rights" to the control of the people in the several states.9 0 Convincing these
more "federalist" members to support a federal civil rights bill required convinc-
ing them that the Bill addressed national civil rights. The need for such an argu-
ment became increasingly clear as the Freedmen's Bureau debates revealed
significant opposition to broad interpretations of national power.91
One approach involved characterizing the Civil Rights Bill as protecting the
rights of national citizenship. If one viewed the Black Codes as violating the civil
rights of American citizens, then dismantling the Codes through the Civil Rights
Bill could be viewed as consistent with still-pervasive views of constitutional fed-
eralism. Constructing such an argument, however, required reconstructing the
Civil Rights Bill. As originally drafted, the Bill protected the rights of every per-
son in the United States, citizen or not. Convincingly characterizing the Civil
Rights Bill as protecting the rights of national citizenship required abandoning, at
least temporarily, the Bill's original full-throated protection of the due process
rights of all persons.
88. See id. at 242.
89. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley's Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1697,
1717 (2012) (discussing radical Republican James Ashley's broad interpretation of Congress's
enforcement powers under the Thirteenth Amendment).
90. See LASH, supra note 18, at 80; see also MALTZ, supra note 18, at 30 ("The task [of
Reconstruction] was further complicated by the Republicans firm attachment to the basic structure of
American federalism."); WLLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 27-39 (1988) (discussing the continued commitment to principles of
federalism in the Reconstruction Congress). According to Eric Foner, moderate Republicans "accepted
the enhancement of national power resulting from the Civil War, but did not believe the legitimate rights
of the states had been destroyed, or the traditional principles of federalism eradicated." FONER, supra
note 10, at 242; see also MALTZ, supra note 18, at 60 ("The disposition of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill
and the apportionment amendment demonstrated that only those civil rights measures that received
virtually unanimous support from mainstream Republicans could be adopted."); NELSON, supra, at 114
("Most Republican supporters of the [Fourteenth] amendment, like the Democratic opponents, feared
centralized power and did not want to see state and local power substantially curtailed."); Michael Les
Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM.
HIST. 65, 67 (1974) ("[M]ost Republicans [during Reconstruction] never desired a broad, permanent
extension of national legislative power.").
91. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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A. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL
On January 29, 1866 several weeks after its initial submission and following
the initial round of debates on the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, proponents amended
the Civil Rights Bill. First, they added a clause declaring that "all persons of
African descent born in the United States are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States." 92 Although some radical Republicans believed abolition auto-
matically made the freedmen citizens, 93 the Supreme Court's decision in Dred
Scott indicated otherwise and the matter remained under dispute.94 The sentence
both rejected Dred Scott and purported to end the debate (it would not). 95 Next,
having defined national citizenship, proponents also narrowed the Bill so that it
protected only U.S. citizens. 96
There was no secret about why the Bill had been altered. Proponents openly
admitted that the change reflected concerns about Congress's power to protect
the fundamental rights of all persons. As Chair of the Judiciary Committee and
House sponsor of the Civil Rights Bill, Representative James F. Wilson (R-IA)
explained:
This bill has been considered by the Committee on the Judiciary, and I have
been instructed by that committee to offer several amendments to it. The first
amendment is in the seventh line of the first section, to strike out the words
"inhabitants of' and insert the words "citizens of the United States in;" so that
that portion will read:
There shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the citi-
zens of the United States in any State or Territory, &c.
This amendment is intended to confine the operation of this bill to citizens of
the United States, instead of extending it to the inhabitants of the several
States, as there seems to be some doubt concerning the power of Congress to
extend this protection to such inhabitants as are not citizens.
92. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). This language was
ultimately altered to read: "That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States." Civil Rights
Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
93. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 899 n.157 (1986) (citing United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas.
785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1867) (No. 16,151) as support for the proposition that the Thirteenth Amendment made
blacks citizens when it abolished slavery).
94. Compare Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 393 (1857) (denying that blacks can be
citizens of the United States), with Citizenship, 10 U.S. Op. Att'y. Gen. 382, 412 (1862), 1862 WL 1412
(arguing that all free persons born in the United States, black or white, are citizens).
95. Congress later added the Citizenship Clause to the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment to
"remove[] all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States." See CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
96. See id. at 1115-25.
97. Id. at 1115 (statement of Rep. Wilson). Wilson then offered a further amendment clarifying that
the equal rights referred to in the Bill were those as were "enjoyed by white citizens." Id. This alteration
narrowing the scope of the bill to protect only citizens got the attention of future Section One framer
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As Wilson's remarks indicate, the alteration in the Civil Rights Bill did not sig-
nal that the Bill's framers had changed their minds about the underlying nature of
the protected rights. The Bill continued to protect the natural rights of life, liberty
and property belonging to all persons. Indeed, although the scope of the Bill
changed, the Bill's original title stayed virtually the same: "[A bill] to protect all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means for their
vindication . .. ."98 This remains the title of the Civil Rights Bill to this day.99 The
narrowing of the Bill to protect only citizens simply reflected that many members
believed that Congress at this point had no constitutional power to protect the nat-
ural rights of anyone except, perhaps, U.S. citizens.
On the other hand, the decision to protect only "citizens" signaled a move
away from the Thirteenth Amendment as the primary source of authority for the
Bill. The Thirteenth Amendment established that no person could be held as a
slave. 00 That proponents of the Civil Rights Bill narrowed the Bill's reach to
citizens amounts to a concession that an insufficient number of their colleagues
believed that the abolition amendment sufficiently authorized the Bill.
B. PROMOTING THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL AS AN ENFORCEMENT OF THE NATURAL RIGHTS
OF DUE PROCESS
The House sponsor of the Civil Rights Bill, Representative James Wilson
(R-IA), spent more time discussing and answering questions about the proposed
bill than any of his colleagues. In his speech introducing the Bill, Wilson left no
doubt about the nature of the rights he sought to protect. The civil rights and
immunities guaranteed by the Civil Rights Bill were nothing less than the natural
rights of due process owed to every free person. Wilson's speech and its impor-
tance to understanding the Civil Rights Act and its relationship to the Fourteenth
Amendment has been almost completely missed by Fourteenth Amendment
scholars. Accordingly, it is worth an extended look.
Wilson first addressed Congress's power to add a sentence defining citizenship
in a manner that embraced all freedmen born in the United States. Like most
Republicans, Wilson rejected the Supreme Court's reasoning in Dred Scott that
blacks could not be citizens of the United States. To Wilson, adding a sentence
declaring all persons born in the United States to be citizens of the United States
John Bingham, who declared his hope that there would be "an opportunity to offer a further
amendment." Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham). As we shall see, Bingham believed that the due process
rights covered by the Civil Rights Act belonged, as a matter of natural right, to all persons. See infra note
181 and accompanying text.
98. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (emphasis added).
99. See An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights and Furnish the Means
of Their Vindication, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). A title ultimately vindicated by the final version of the
Civil Rights Act passed after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 243 and
accompanying text.
100. See U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
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was "merely declaratory of what the law now is." 01 If members nevertheless
insisted on a showing of congressional power to bestow citizenship, Congress
had the enumerated power "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization."1 02
Next, Wilson turned to the Bill's list of "civil rights" and "immunities."103
"This part of the Bill," Wilson conceded, "will probably excite more opposition
and elicit more discussion than any other." 10 4 Wilson then explained to his more
moderate colleagues what "civil rights and immunities" did not include:
Do they mean that in all things civil, social, political, all citizens, without dis-
tinction of race or color, shall be equal? By no means can they be so construed.
Do they mean that all citizens shall vote in the several States? No; for suffrage
is a political right which has been left under the control of the several States,
subject to the action of Congress only when it becomes necessary to enforce
the guarantee of a republican form of government. Nor do they mean that all
citizens shall sit on the juries, or that their children shall attend the same
schools. These are not civil rights or immunities.0 5
Having denied that the Bill protects all civil and political rights, Wilson then
addressed the nature of the Bill's protected rights. Quoting treatise writer
Chancellor James Kent, Wilson explained that the Bill protected the "absolute
rights of individuals" to life, liberty and property:
What are civil rights? I understand civil rights to be simply the absolute rights
of individuals, such as-
"The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to ac-
quire and enjoy property." "Right itself, in civil society, is that which any man
is entitled to have, or to do, or to require from others, within the limits of pre-
scribed law."106
According to Wilson, "the rights which this bill proposes to protect every citi-
zen in the enjoyment of throughout the entire dominion of the Republic" were in
fact "the natural rights of man."'107
Notice that, despite the recent narrowing of the Bill to protecting only "citi-
zens," Wilson describes the protected rights as the "absolute rights of individu-
als," to "which any man is entitled." In other words, the rights protected under the
101. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
102. Id. at 1117 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
103. Eventually, proponents of the Act would agree to remove the words "civil rights and
immunities," leaving only the specific list of rights. For a discussion of the significance of that removal,
see Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the
Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 385-88 (2011).
104. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 199 (New Work, 0. Halsted
1826)).
107. Id.
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original bill had not changed, even if the group to be protected in these rights had.
This distinction is critical to understanding the amended bill. Scholars sometimes
attempt to describe the rights protected by the Civil Rights Bill as reflecting a
theory of the rights of citizenship. 0 8 This is true only to the extent that citizens
are persons and, therefore, they enjoy the same rights that belong to all persons. It
is not a theory of citizenship per se, however, that explains the rights protected by
the amended Bill. Instead, the Bill continued to reflect a theory of natural rights.
That the Bill had been altered to protect only citizens reflected a political strategy
to produce a broadly acceptable bill that protected at least some people in their
natural rights.
By altering the Bill to protect the rights of federal citizens, advocates could
plausibly deny they sought to upset the traditional distinction between federal
and state responsibilities. Wilson explained:
Mr. Speaker, I think I may safely affirm that this bill, so far as it declares the
equality of all citizens in the enjoyment of civil rights and immunities, merely
affirms existing law. We are following the Constitution. We are reducing to
statute form the spirit of the Constitution. We are establishing no new right,
declaring no new principle. It is not the object of this bill to establish new
rights, but to protect and enforce those which already belong to every
citizen. o'
108. See, e.g., GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: THE
CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 103-05 (2013); Kaczorowski,
supra note 93; Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Rights of Citizenship: Two Framers, Two Amendments,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1269, 1285-88 (2009).
109. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson). Wilson's
argument that the Bill sought to do nothing more than enforce preexisting constitutional rights had the
happy (and likely calculated) effect of echoing the theories of moderate Republicans like John Bingham
who had previously proposed an amendment seeking to protect the preexisting rights of American
citizens. A few days earlier, Bingham had introduced an amendment declaring:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to
the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States [Art. IV,
§2], and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and prop-
erty [Fifth Amendment].
Id. at 1034 (statement of Rep. Bingham). Bingham had insisted that his proposed amendment
protected no new rights, but only those constitutionally enumerated privileges and immunities that states
were already obligated to enforce according to Bingham's understanding of Article IV. As Bingham
explained:
I repel the suggestion made here in the heat of debate, that the committee or any of its members
who favor this proposition seek in any form to mar the Constitution of the country, or take away
from any State any right that belongs to it, or from any citizen of any State any right that belongs to
him under that Constitution. The proposition pending before the House is simply a proposition to
arm the Congress of the United States, by the consent of the people of the United States, with the
power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today. It "hath that extent-no
more .... "
Id. at 1088. Wilson echoes these same assurances in his defense of the amended Civil Rights Bill.
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With the Bill thus limited to American citizens, proponents could now plausi-
bly use the citizen-based Comity Clause of Article IV..o as a potential source of
authority for the Civil Rights Bill. As we shall see, there were significant prob-
lems associated with this approach, but the Comity Clause nevertheless seemed
useful, given the well-known list of Comity Clause rights described in Corfield v.
Coryell.1 1 Quoting Justice Washington's opinion, Wilson declared that the rights
of American citizenship included such Comity Clause rights as:
"The right of protection by the Government, the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus;
to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take,
hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; to be exempt from higher
taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State."112
Although Justice Washington's opinion referred to rights similar to those pro-
tected by the Civil Rights Act, relying on Corfield raised a number of problems.
For example, Wilson omitted the full list of rights provided by Justice
Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, including the rights of suffrage.113 Including
this Corfieldian right, however, would have doomed the Bill.114 By relying on
Corfield, proponents had to explain why the Bill protected only some Corfieldian
rights but not others.1 1
Proponents addressed the difficulty by denying that the Bill was an actual
attempt to enforce the citizenship rights of Corfield and the Comity Clause.
Those provisions, they explained, were cited only by way of analogy.116 in fact,
the Civil Rights Act was not an effort to protect the Comity Clause rights "of citi-
zens in the several states," or those rights which attach only upon securing
national citizenship. Instead, proponents explained the Civil Rights Bill protected
natural rights that preexisted citizenship-state or federal. All citizens, of course,
enjoyed such natural rights, but neither state nor federal citizenship were the
source of such rights.
Like most radical Republicans, Wilson believed that all free persons were enti-
tled to enjoy the natural rights of life, liberty, and property.1 17 And, like his
110. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
111. See 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
112. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-18 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (quoting
Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52).
113. See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
114. At this point in 1866, trying to provide the freedmen with the right to vote was a non-starter. See
FONER, supra note 10, at 240.
115. This was a point that opponents of the Bill jumped on. In fact, Corfield became such a
problematic case for proponents of civil rights in the Thirty-Ninth Congress that they eventually
abandoned the case as representative of Comity Clause rights. See LASH, supra note 18, at 162-68.
116. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
117. See id. at 1117-18 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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radical colleagues, Wilson also insisted that the Civil Rights Bill represented an
appropriate enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of slavery. 1 s
After all, Wilson explained, "A man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this
bill cannot be reduced to slavery."119 Wilson conceded, however, that the rights
listed in the Civil Rights Bill could be viewed as protecting more than just the
freedom established by the Thirteenth Amendment. 12 0 For those colleagues who
believed this was the case, Congress had additional authority to protect the "great
fundamental [civil] rights" of every person. 121 These rights were the "absolute
Rights of Individuals" to life, liberty, and property described by the great English
jurist William Blackstone. Explained Wilson:
What are these rights? ... Blackstone classifies them under three articles, as
follows:
1. The right of personal security; which, he says,
"Consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs,
his body, his health, and his reputation."
2. The right of personal liberty; and this, he says,
"Consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's
person to whatever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprison-
ment or restraint, unless by due course of law."
3. The right of personal property; which he defines to be,
"The free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any con-
trol or diminution, save only by the laws of the land." 122
Wilson then quotes a passage from Kent's Commentaries:
"The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy prop-
erty. These rights have been justly considered, and frequently declared, by the
people of this country, to be natural, inherent, and inalienable." 123
Wilson thus presented the narrowed Civil Rights Bill as protecting the natural
rights of life, liberty, and property-"the absolute rights of persons." Although
the narrowed version of the Civil Rights Bill protected only citizens' rights, the
rights themselves were the unalienable and natural rights of all individuals, as
described in classic works like Blackstone's Commentaries.
118. See id. at 1118.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing 1 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1753)).
123. Id. (quoting 1 KENT, supra note 106, at 599).
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Wilson's counterpart in the Senate, Lyman Trumbull described the rights
protected by the narrowed versions of the Civil Rights Bill in the same way.
Pointing to the Bill's list of rights, Trumbull explained that "[t]his section is
the basis of the whole bill. The other provisions of the Bill contain the neces-
sary machinery to give effect to what are declared to be the rights of all persons
in the first section... "124 These "civil liberties," according to Trumbull, "thus
defined by Blackstone:"
"Civil liberty is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws
and no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
public."
That is the liberty to which every citizen is entitled; that is the liberty which
was intended to be secured by the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution of the United States originally, and more especially by the
amendment which has recently been adopted; and in a note to Blackstone's
Commentaries it is stated that-
"In this definition of civil liberty it ought to be understood, or rather expressed,
that the restraints introduced by the law should be equal to all, or as much so as
the nature of things will admit."125
Trumbull's reference to the Declaration of Independence and the original
Constitution echoes the traditional abolitionist reference to the Declaration's ref-
erence to "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness," and its embodiment in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. To radical Republicans, the dual
reference was a boilerplate description of natural rights.
Like Wilson, Trumbull also referenced Comity Clause cases like Corfield v.
Coryell.126 When challenged, however, Trumbull expressly denied that the Bill
attempted to enforce the rights of the Comity Clause. Trumbull's denial was
unavoidable. As antebellum case law made abundantly clear, the Comity Clause
applied only in cases where out-of-state citizens had been denied rights provided
to in-state citizens. 127 Thus, when Trumbull raised Comity Clause cases like
Corfield, opponents immediately objected that Trumbull had misrepresented the
Comity Clause and wrongly relied on that clause in support of the Civil Rights
Bill. 128 In reply, Trumbull agreed that the Comity Clause did nothing more than
124. Id. at 474 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
125. Id. (quoting 1 Blackstone, supra note 120).
126. See id. at 474-75.
127. See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230); Campbell
v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 542 (Md. 1797); Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92 (1827);
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 524 (N.Y. 1812). For a detailed discussion of these cases and the
antebellum reading of the Comity Clause, see Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, Part I: "Privileges and Immunities" as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1258-72
(2010).
128. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 597 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis) ("All these rights and
privileges are attributed by the decision of the court to the citizens of one State going into another
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protect out-of-state citizens, and that the Civil Rights Bill protected an altogether
different set of rights. He had referred to the Comity Clause, Trumbull explained,
only to highlight the justice of providing in-state citizens their own set of funda-
mental rights:
[T]he Senator occupies an hour of his speech to show that certain cases which
I thought proper to refer to in a few remarks, the other day, in order to ascertain
what was meant by the term "citizen of the United States," have no application
to the rights of a citizen in a State. Those cases, he says, were based upon that
clause of the Constitution which declares that the citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,
and they relate entirely to the rights which a citizen in one State has on going
into another State, and not to the rights of the citizens belonging to the State. I
never denied that. I would have told the Senator in one moment that the cases
were not introduced for any such purpose as he supposes, but they were intro-
duced for the purpose of ascertaining, if we could, by judicial decision what
was meant by the term "citizen of the United States;" and inasmuch as there
had been judicial decisions upon this clause of the Constitution, in which it
had been held that the rights of a citizen of the United States were certain great
fundamental rights, such as the right to life, to liberty, and to avail one's self of
all the laws passed for the benefit of the citizen to enable him to enforce his
rights; inasmuch as this was the definition given to the term as applied in that
part of the Constitution, I reasoned from that, that when the Constitution had
been amended and slavery abolished, and we were about to pass a law declar-
ing every person, no matter of what color, born in the United States a citizen of
the United States, the same rights would then appertain to all persons who
were clothed with American citizenship. That was the object for which those
cases were introduced. The Senator seemed to suppose, and argued to show
what no one would controvert, that they were not cases deciding upon the
rights of the citizen in the State in which he resided.129
According to Trumbull, the Civil Rights Bill protected only certain fundamen-
tal rights that were discussed in Corfield: not those belonging as a particular mat-
ter to U.S. citizens, or to citizens in the several states, but only those rights
involving "certain great fundamental rights, such as the right to life, to liberty,
and to avail one's self of all the laws passed for the benefit of the citizen to enable
him to enforce his rights."130 These were the natural rights of due process-a
point Trumbull emphasized in the following exchange:
Mr. MCDOUGALL. I beg leave to ask the Senator how he interprets the term
"civil rights" in the bill.
State .... The opinions relied on by the honorable Senator do not establish any other proposition."); see
also id. at 1268-70 (statement of Rep. Kerr) (opposing the Bill and denying it can be grounded on the
Comity Clause, given the limited antebellum understanding of the Comity Clause).
129. Id. at 600 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
130. Id.
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Mr. TRUMBULL. The first section of the bill defines what I understand to be
civil rights: the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be sued, and to
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell, lease, hold, and convey real and perso-
nal property, and to full and equal benefit to all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property. These I understand to be civil rights, funda-
mental rights belonging to every man as a free man, and which under the
Constitution as it now exists we have a right to protect every man in.131
According to Trumbull's argument, the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and
property are announced in the Declaration of Independence and codified in the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (part of the "Constitution as it now
exists"). Corfield helps clarify the precise nature of some of these rights-rights
which belong to all citizens and which Congress has power to enforce. As a radi-
cal Republican, Trumbull embraced the theory that Congress had power to
enforce all of the rights contained in the Constitution, including those declared by
the Fifth Amendment. Although Trumbull does not (at this point) specifically tie
the rights of life, liberty, and property to the Due Process Clause, his listeners
would have understood his reference to rights contained in "the Constitution as it
now exists." It would not have been understood as a reference to the Thirteenth
Amendment because expanding congressional authority beyond Section Two
was the point of amending the scope of the original bill. Once again, here is the
House sponsor of the Civil Rights Bill, James Wilson:
What are the great civil rights to which the first section of the bill refers? I find
in the bill of rights which the gentleman desires to have enforced by an amend-
ment to the Constitution that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." I understand that these constitute the
civil rights belonging to the citizens in connection with those which are neces-
sary for the protection and maintenance and perfect enjoyment of the rights
thus specifically named, and these are the right to which this bill relates, hav-
ing nothing to do with subjects submitted to the control of the several States.
Now, I want to know whether these rights [in the Civil Rights Bill] are any
greater than the rights which are included in the general term "life, liberty,
and property."132
Others were just as explicit in describing the Bill as an attempt to enforce the
Due Process Clause. Consider, for example, the following excerpts from a speech
on the Civil Rights Act by Representative M. Russell Thayer (R-PA):
Would it not be an extraordinary circumstance if the framers of the
Constitution had made a Constitution which was powerless to protect the
131. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 1294-95 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (emphasis added).
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citizens of the United States in their fundamental civil rights, their rights of
life, liberty, and property? And yet to that position are these gentlemen
driven who deny the existence of any power which authorizes Congress to
pass this bill.
If I am asked from whence the power is derived to pass this bill, I reply that
I derive it, in the first place, from the second section of the late amendment
to the Constitution. I say further, that so far as regards the power to declare
the freedmen citizens is concerned, it may be clearly derived (if it be not in-
herent in the very frame of every Government) from that clause of the
Constitution which gives the express power to Congress to pass laws for
naturalization. And I might say, also, that in my judgment sufficient power
is found, by implication at least, in that clause of the Constitution which
guaranties to all the citizens of the United States their right to life, liberty,
and property.
There are sources of power enough from which this power can be deduced. In
my judgment no man can find any difficulty in seeking con[s]titutional
grounds upon which to place his justification for supporting this bill....
... If, then, the freedmen are now citizens, or if we have the constitutional
power to make them such, they are clearly entitled to those guarantees of the
Constitution of the United States which are intended for the protection of all
citizens.
They are entitled to the benefit of that guarantee of the Constitution which
secures to every citizen the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and no just
reason exists why they should not enjoy the protection of that guarantee of the
Constitution.
... [The recently enacted black codes] demonstrate [] the necessity for enforc-
ing the guarantees of liberty and of American citizenship conferred by the
Constitution.
... [This bill] contains no power which is not necessary to protect and defend
the great rights of American citizenship.
I approve of the proposition of the gentleman from Ohio, [Mr. BINGHAM,] in
which he offers to put this protection substantially into the Constitution of the
United States, though, according to my best judgment, it is not necessary to do
so, and I have little hope that the proposition he submits will ever be carried
into effect. Still I will, in order to make things doubly secure, vote for the prop-
osition of the gentleman from Ohio. I will also vote for this bill. . . .
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While engaged in this great work of restoration, it concerns our honor that we
forget not those who are unable to help themselves; who, whatever may have
been the misery and wretchedness of their former condition, were on our side in
the great struggle which has closed, and whose rights we cannot disregard or
neglect without violating the most sacred obligations of duty and of honor ... .
To us they hold out to-day their supplicating hands, asking for protection for
themselves and their posterity. We cannot disregard this appeal, and stand
acquitted before the country and the world of basely abandoning to a miserable
fate those who have a right to demand the protection of your flag and the
immunities guarantied to every freeman by your Constitution.1 33
Representative Thayer said nothing about the Comity Clause in his entire
speech supporting the Civil Rights Bill. Instead, Thayer pointed to the naturaliza-
tion clause as granting power to make freedmen citizens, and then pointed to the
Due Process Clause as declaring the rights covered by the Bill-rights enjoyed
not only by citizens, but also by "every freeman."
In addition to finding power in the Thirteenth Amendment to enforce the rights
of due process, Thayer's remarks show that he also believed Congress had inher-
ent power to enforce the constitutional rights of American citizens, including
those protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, even
though Thayer supported Bingham's proposed Amendment, he did not believe
that such an amendment was necessary.
The idea that Congress had inherent power to enforce enumerated constitu-
tional rights was held by a number of radical Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, including James Wilson. As Wilson put it, "the right to exercise this
power depends upon no express delegation, but runs with the rights it is designed
to protect."1 3 4 In support of this theory of implied power, Wilson cited antebellum
cases such as Prigg v. Pennsylvania, in which the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress had the inherent power to enforce the rights of slave owners under the
Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV.1 3 5
Not all Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress shared Thayer's broad read-
ing of the Thirteenth Amendment or his views about implied power to enforce
enumerated rights. The result was an ongoing debate the about congressional
enforcement of the Due Process Clause. Consider, for example, the colloquy
between Representative Charles A. Eldridge (D-WI) and Representative Thayer
regarding Thayer's claim that the Civil Rights Bill was a constitutionally author-
ized enforcement of the Due Process Clause:
Mr. ELDRIDGE....
133. Id. at 1152-54 (statement of Rep. Thayer) (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 1119 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
135. See id. at 1294 (quoting Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842)).
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But gentlemen claim that there is warrant and authority in the second section
of the recent amendment to the Constitution for this measure. I believe that is
the only authority upon which the eloquent gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
THAYER] rested his claim of the right to pass this bill.
Mr. THAYER. The gentleman will recollect that I also founded a portion of my
argument in favor of the constitutionality of this bill upon the guarantee which
is contained in the Constitution, of life, liberty and property to citizens of
the United States, and I argued that if this measure was necessary to enforce
that guarantee it was a power necessarily contained by implication in the
Constitution.
Mr. ELDRIDGE. Then the gentleman differs in all his claims with his friend, the
able gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BINGHAM,] who introduced the resolution pro-
posing the amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of meeting the con-
stitutional objections to the passage of this bill. He admitted, or seemed to
admit, when that resolution was under consideration, that there is by the
Constitution as it now stands no warrant for the Federal Government to go into
a State for the purpose of protecting the citizen in his rights of life, liberty, and
property. I shall not undertake to argue that question. It is enough for my pur-
pose that the majority of this House have urged the necessity of the passage of
that resolution to amend the Constitution in order to enable them to attain the
purpose sought by this bill.136
Thayer dodged the issue of Congress's Thirteenth Amendment power by citing
congressional power to enforce the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Eldridge countered by noting the position of moderate Republicans, like John
Bingham, who believed it would take a constitutional amendment to enforce the
Due Process Clause.13 7 Both men thus understood the Bill as attempting to
enforce the rights of due process; they simply disagreed on whether Congress had
power to do so.
Other members agreed that the Bill sought to enforce due process rights, but
they insisted that the Bill was unnecessary because such rights were already pro-
tected. According to Representative Anthony Thornton (D-IL):
The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. THAYER] insists that the power exists
by virtue of the fifth amendment, which provides that no man shall be deprived
of life, liberty and property without due process of law. Is this bill necessary to
prevent the deprivation of life, liberty, and property? If laws are enacted in the
southern States of the character alleged, their constitutionality can be tested in
the courts of the United States and there declared to be void because in viola-
tion of the supreme law.13 8
136. Id. at 1155 (statements of Reps. Eldridge & Thayer).
137. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
138. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1156-57 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thornton).
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As we have already seen, similar claims were made against the necessity of the
Freedmen's Bureau.13 9 Although the Supreme Court had ruled in Barron v.
Baltimore that the Bill of Rights did not bind the states,140 some members either
had not read the opinion or simply believed otherwise. 141 Accordingly, members
like Thornton agreed that the Bill protected the rights of due process but believed
that such protection already existed.
In sum, there was widespread understanding by both proponents and critics
that the Civil Rights Bill sought to protect the natural rights of due process as
declared in the Fifth Amendment. The issue was whether such protection was
necessary and whether Congress had the power to enforce such rights. As we
shall see, Bingham agreed that Congress needed to enforce the rights of due pro-
cess against state abridgement, but he insisted that it would take a constitutional
amendment to make that possible.
C. JOHN BINGHAM'S CALL FOR A DUE PROCESS AMENDMENT
Representative John Bingham (R-OH) authored Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment, including the Due Process Clause. An abolitionist Republican, 14 2
Bingham fully supported the idea that Congress was duty bound to respond to the
Black Codes and to protect the fundamental due process rights of the freedmen
and all United States citizens. Unlike his colleague James Wilson-who pursued
the avenue of legislation-Bingham focused on securing an amendment to the
Constitution.
On December 6, 1865, long before the introduction of the Civil Rights Bill,
Bingham introduced the following joint resolution "to amend the Constitution of
the United States so as to empower Congress to pass all necessary and proper
laws to secure to all persons in every State of the Union equal protection in their
rights, life, liberty, and property." 143
On February 26, 1866, on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
Bingham introduced a proposed amendment to the Constitution declaring:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal pro-
tection in the rights of life, liberty, and property."
In his remarks to the House introducing the Resolution, Bingham stressed that
"[e]very word of the proposed amendment is to-day in the Constitution of our
139. See supra note 55-57 and accompanying text.
140. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
141. See AMAR, supra note 4, at 1203-12 (discussing the "Barron contrarians").
142. For a recent biography of John Bingham and his abolitionist Republican roots, see generally
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2013).
143. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865).
144. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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country, save the words conferring the express grant of power upon the Congress
of the United States." 1 45 He added,
The residue of the resolution, as the House will see by a reference to the
Constitution, is the language of the second section of the fourth article, and of
a portion of the fifth amendment adopted by the First Congress in 1789, and
made part of the Constitution of the country.1"6
Notice that Bingham understands, and expects his colleagues to understand,
the language securing the "equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and prop-
erty" as a reference to rights declared by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Bingham believed that the Supremacy Clause already imposed an
obligation on the states "to obey these great provisions of the Constitution, in
their letter and spirit. "147 Unfortunately, despite their oaths to uphold the
Constitution and "this immortal bill of rights," state officials had acted "in utter
disregard of that official oath which the Constitution required" and had "violated
in every sense of the word these provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, the enforcement of which are absolutely essential to American national-
ity." 148 To date, Congress could do nothing about these violations because it had
no enumerated power "to enforce obedience to these requirements of the
Constitution." 1 4 9
As reflected in his initial announcement and his first draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Bingham believed that all persons had an equal right to the due pro-
cess protections of life, liberty, and property. His proposed amendment thus gave
Congress the power to enforce both the Comity Clause rights of citizens and the
due process rights of all persons. Bingham also believed that, despite the addition
of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress remained powerless to enforce the rights
of due process against state abridgement. The failure of the original Constitution
to grant Congress power to enforce the Bill of Rights was, to Bingham, "the want
of the Republic." 5 o His proposed Amendment supplied that power.
Despite Bingham's desire to increase the protected rights of freedmen, he
opposed the narrowed version of the Civil Rights Bill. In a speech explaining his
reasons for opposing the Bill, Bingham not only expressly embraced the due pro-
cess reading of the Civil Rights Bill, but also explained why enforcing due pro-
cess rights required a constitutional amendment.
I will discuss Bingham's speech momentarily. First, and by way of introduc-
tion, this Article considers how proponents of the narrowed version of the Civil
Rights Bill responded to concerns about language referencing the general subject
of "civil rights." Far from an ancillary issue, the complaints-and the outcome-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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open a window on the critical role played by moderate and conservative
Republicans in controlling the substantive outcome of debates in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress. This also helps explain why Congress embraced legislation
protecting procedural due process rights but avoided nationalizing the general
substance of civil rights in the states.
D. FEDERALISM AND REMOVING THE LANGUAGE "CIVIL RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES"
On March 8, 1866 Bingham proposed striking the language "[a]nd there shall
be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among citizens of the United
States in any State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or
previous condition of slavery" from the Civil Rights Bill.51 He would speak
about his reasons for proposing the change the following day. In the meantime,
other congressmen rose in support of Bingham's proposal to remove the term
"civil rights" from the Bill. For instance, Representative Columbus Delano (R-
OH) stated:
[I]n my opinion the bill would be very much improved and relieved from
many of its serious difficulties and objectionable features if it were amended in
accordance with the proposition suggested by my colleague, [Mr. BINGHAM.] I
think that, with this amendment, I could myself now, without any further light
on the subject, vote for it. But we must discuss it as it is . . . .152
According to Delano, "as it [was]," the Bill had serious problems. To begin
with, Delano had doubts about its constitutionality:
I shall vote for it, if possible. If I can be brought to believe that there is a rea-
sonable probability of its constitutionality, so that I can justify my conscience
in turning over the question of the power of Congress to pass this bill to the
courts, I shall sustain it; but without some further light upon the question than I
now have, I do feel that there are such difficulties in the way as call for a care-
ful examination of the provisions of this bill .... 153
However, even if Congress could claim such power, Delano objected to the
provision conferring "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens," which he argued
conferred on freedmen the right to be jurors.154
Delano next asked the Bill's House sponsor James Wilson where the
Constitution granted Congress power to determine "who shall be competent to
give evidence in the State courts?"" He continued,
151. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1266 (1866).
152. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 156 (1866) (statement of Rep. Delano).
153. Id.
154. Id. Wilson responded that this was not the case, but Delano remained dubious. See id. at 157.
155. Id. (statement of Rep. Delano).
1430 [Vol. 106:1389
ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS
[W]here is the authority in the fundamental law of this land for this Congress
to declare who shall be witnesses in a State court? Is it in the old Constitution?
And if so, in what clause? Or is it in the amendment to the Constitution abol-
ishing slavery? I desire to hear from the gentleman upon that point.1 56
Wilson's response hinted at the extended argument he would later make based
on the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause:
I place the power of Congress to secure to these citizens the right to testify in
the courts upon the same basis exactly that I place the power of Congress to
provide protection for the fundamental rights of the citizen commonly called
civil rights, so that if the presence of a citizen in the witness- box of a court is
necessary to protect his personal liberty, his personal security, his right to
property, he shall not be deprived of that protection by a State law declaring
that his mouth shall be sealed and that he shall not be a witness in that court.
That is one of the protective remedies which must run with these great civil
rights belonging to every citizen. And I will say to the gentleman that when I
come to close the discussion on this bill I shall enlarge somewhat on this point
if the temper of the House at the time shall disclose a disposition to hear further
discussion."'
Protecting the jury right, in other words, was necessary and proper to securing
the rights of life, liberty, and property.
Delano found Wilson's reference to a citizen's right to "personal liberty," "per-
sonal security," "property" too vague and pressed Wilson "to name the clause of
the Constitution in which he finds the power."158 In response, Wilson explained
that such power could be found in both the Thirteenth Amendment and
Congress's implied power to enforce the rights of the federal Constitution:
If the gentleman [Mr. DELANO] had read my remarks at the opening of this
debate he would have seen very distinctly the provision of the Constitution
upon which I base this bill so far as it relates to persons who are liable to be
reduced to a condition of slavery, and that is the amendment to the
Constitution abolishing slavery and conferring an express delegation of power
upon Congress.
But I placed it upon a broader ground, and it was this: that these people, being
entitled to certain rights as citizens of the United States, were entitled to pro-
tection in those rights, and that the power thus to protect them is necessarily
implied from the entire body of the Constitution, which was made for the pro-
tection of these rights, and upon the duty of the Government to enforce and
protect all those rights. I based the power of Congress to select the means in
156. Id.
157. Id. (statement of Rep. Wilson).
158. Id. (statement of Rep. Delano).
2018] 1431
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL
accordance with the doctrines laid down in the case of McCulloch, vs. The
State of Maryland."'
Delano was not impressed with the idea of implied congressional power. "The
duties of this Congress," Delano replied, "rest upon its constitutional powers, and
those powers are to be derived from the Constitution if found at all."1 6 0 In
response, Wilson pointed to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
inquiring of Delano:
[D]oes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. DELANo] believe that persons as citizens
of the United States are entitled to any rights? If they are entitled to any rights,
are the great fundamental civil rights of life, liberty, and property involved
among them?
And if they are entitled, as citizens of the United States, to those rights, are
they entitled to protection of those rights from the hands of the Government?
And should a State enact laws and attempt to enforce them which will deprive
the citizens of the United States of those rights, may we not intervene to pro-
tect them in spite of those laws of the State?.16
Here, Wilson finally revealed his basis for believing Congress had authority to
pass the Civil Rights Bill. The Bill, according to Wilson, was an exercise of
Congress's implied power to adopt any necessary and proper means of enforcing
the citizen's right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law. Now fully understanding Wilson's argument, Delano's response was
a veritable seminar on the moderate Republican theory of national authority in
the aftermath of the Civil War:
I believe that the citizens of the States are entitled to many rights. I believe that
those rights are to be guarantied and sustained and enforced by the laws of the
States under the constitutions of the States, and by the Congress of the United
States when there is power given by the Constitution of the United States to
enforce those rights.
But I do not believe that the rights of the States are utterly overwhelmed and
dethroned. I know that for years we have been swinging the pendulum of pub-
lic opinion toward the doctrine of State rights until it threatened the subversion
of the Federal Government. And I stand here in my place to-day to say that one
of the most serious apprehensions I have, in the extreme of public opinion fluc-
tuating from one point to another, is that we may fall into an error about as
great and dangerous as that which has caused us these long years of bloody
war.
159. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 157 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (emphasis
added).
160. Id. (statement of Rep. Delano).
161. Id. (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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I suppose there are certain rights of citizenship that are exclusively within the
control of the States, under the constitutions of the States....
... [W]hat I say here to-day, that the powers of Congress are specific powers,
and that beyond those specific powers Congress cannot go without violating
the Constitution. 1 6 2
At this point, Delano's time had expired, and it was Representative John
Bingham's turn to speak. 1 63 Bingham, however, wished for Delano to continue.
"I will yield to my colleague, [Mr. DELANO,]" Bingham stated, "and trust to the
indulgence of the House for an opportunity to be heard upon this subject." 1 6 4
Delano proceeded to expressly deny that Congress had either express power
under the Thirteenth Amendment or implied power under the Fifth Amendment
to enforce the rights of life, liberty, and property:
In my opinion, if we adopt the principle of this bill we declare in effect that
Congress has authority to go into the States and manage and legislate with
regard to all the personal rights of the citizen-rights of life, liberty, and prop-
erty....
Now, sir, I proceed to inquire whether the constitutional amendment abolish-
ing slavery confers on Congress the power to enact a measure of this character.
That amendment provides-[Amendment quoted] ....
Now, what is this provision of the Constitution? It is the abolition of slavery
and involuntary servitude. It is authority by Congress to pass proper legislation
for the enforcement of that principle. Now, sir, can it be claimed by fair rea-
soning that the right to testify is necessarily incident to freedom? 165
Wilson then intervened, seeking again to turn the conversation from the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Due Process Clause:
The gentleman will pardon me for an interruption. Suppose that the only per-
son witnessing a state of facts necessary to be given in court for the protection
of life, liberty, and property should be a black man, has the State the right to
say that that man, the only person living who has a knowledge of the facts to
protect a citizen, should have no right to testify? 16 6
162. Id. (statement of Rep. Delano).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 158 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
165. Id. (statement of Rep. Delano).
166. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 158 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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Delano shot back, "Does the gentleman believe the Constitution of the United
States is so framed as to say this power may be exercised?"1 67 He continued:
We proclaimed freedom to this race, and reserved to ourselves the power to
enforce it, but we did not reserve to ourselves the power to enter the States and
regulate the domestic relations of life, liberty, and property.
I must say, therefore, that I do not see how we can sustain the principles of this
bill. I said in the outset that I wanted to see the provisions of this bill adopted
or enforced upon the South, and it was with this thought before me that I intro-
duced, at an early day of the session, an amendment to the Constitution requir-
ing each State to provide for the security of life, liberty, and property, and the
rightful pursuit of happiness, and giving to Congress power to enforce these
rights where the States withheld them ....
I am still of opinion that if this subject is developed and investigated as it
should be, that if we do anything upon this subject at all, we had better do it by
taking up the amendment to the Constitution offered by my colleague, [Mr.
BINGHAM,] now postponed till April, modifying it in the form I have sug-
gested, and making it the fundamental law, and then proceeding to secure the
rights of these persons in a way in which we shall not be trampling down or
endangering the fundamental law of the land.168
Wilson insisted that the Civil Rights Bill protected the rights guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Delano agreed, but denied that
Congress had any power to enforce those rights. In his view, the better approach
was to pass the Amendment as proposed by John Bingham, expressly authorizing
congressional enforcement of the due process rights of life, liberty, and property.
Delano's accusation that the Bill was unconstitutional because Congress
lacked the power to protect these rights would be used-unsuccessfully-by his
political opponents later that summer.16 9 By that point, however, the country
would be considering precisely the kind of amendment Delano recommended.
E. THE DUE PROCESS OBJECTIONS OF JOHN BINGHAM
On March 9, 1866 John Bingham spoke at length about his objections to the
proposed Civil Rights Bill.170 Bingham began by suggesting that, whatever the
Bill's final form, Congress should add a clause providing for "a final appeal of all
167. Id. (statement of Rep. Delano)
168. Id. at 158-59.
169. Gen. George W. Morgan, speech at Coshocton, Ohio (Aug. 21, 1866), in SPEECHES OF THE
CAMPAIGN OF 1866, IN THE STATES OF OHIO, INDIANA, AND KENTUCKY: THE MOST REMARKABLE
SPEECHES ON BOTH SIDES 15, 16 (Cincinnati, Cincinnati Commercial 1866).
170. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham). Congress did so;
see also id. at 1367 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
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questions of law arising under it to the Supreme Court of the United States."171
Bingham then assured his colleagues that he supported the general policy of
extending the rights of the national Constitution:
I do not oppose any legislation which is authorized by the Constitution of my
country to enforce in its letter and its spirit the bill of rights as embodied in
that Constitution. I know that the enforcement of the bill of rights is the want
of the Republic. I know if it had been enforced in good faith in every State of
the Union the calamities and conflicts and crimes and sacrifices of the past five
years would have been impossible.172
Like Trumbull, Wilson, Thayer, and Delano, Bingham understood the pro-
posed Civil Rights Bill as an attempt to enforce the natural due process rights of
life, liberty, and property. However, in his view, this attempt was beyond con-
gressional authority:
[I]n view of the text of the Constitution of my country, in view of all its past inter-
pretations, in view of the manifest and declared intent of the men who framed it,
the enforcement of the bill of rights, touching the life, liberty, and property of ev-
ery citizen of the Republic within every organized State of the Union, is of the re-
served powers of the States, to be enforced by State tribunals and by State officials
acting under the solemn obligations of an oath imposed upon them by the
Constitution of the United States. Who can doubt this conclusion who considers
the words of the Constitution: "the powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people?" The Constitution does not delegate to the United
States the power to punish offenses against the life, liberty, or property of the citi-
zen in the States, nor does it prohibit that power to the States, but leaves it as the
reserved power of the States, to be by them exercised ....
... I am with [Mr. WILSON] in an earnest desire to have the bill of rights in
your Constitution enforced everywhere. But I ask that it be enforced in accord-
ance with the Constitution of my country.173
Bingham had no difficulty with the Bill's citizenship provision, which he said
was "simply declaratory of what is written in the Constitution, that every human
being bom within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing alle-
giance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a
natural-born citizen." 17 4 His objection concerned Congress's attempt to "declare
by congressional enactment as to citizens of the United States within the States
that there shall be no discrimination among them of civil rights[J" 175 According
17 1. Id.
172. Id. at 1291 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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to Bingham, this provision went well beyond the protection of enumerated
national rights and infringed upon subjects left to the people in the several states:
What are civil rights? ... I respectfully submit to that gentleman [Mr.
WILSON], that by all authority the term "civil rights" as used in this bill does
include and embrace every right that pertains to the citizen as such.
Why, sir, the very origin of the term "civil" ought to satisfy gentlemen on
this point, that it has relation to the rights and all the rights of the citizen ... . A
distinction is taken, I know very well, in modem times, between civil and po-
litical rights. I submit with all respect that the term "political rights" is only a
limitation of the term "civil rights," and by general acceptation signifies
that class of civil rights which are more directly exercised by the citizen in
connection with the government of his country. If this be so, are not political
rights all embraced in the term "civil rights," and must it not of necessity be so
interpreted? ...
If civil rights has this extent, what, then, is proposed by the provision of the
first section? Simply to strike down by congressional enactment every State
constitution which makes a discrimination on account of race or color in any
of the civil rights of the citizen. I might say here, without the least fear of con-
tradiction, that there is scarcely a State in this Union which does not, by its
constitution or by its statute laws, make some discrimination on account of
race or color between citizens of the United States in respect of civil rights. 176
To Bingham, an undefined reference to "civil rights" rendered the Bill improp-
erly overbroad-as a general category, civil rights included not only political
rights, but all manner of local laws. Like most of his moderate colleagues,
Bingham believed Congress had neither the power nor the responsibility to
remove all racial distinctions then existing in the states. In fact, following this
speech, sponsors of the Bill accepted Bingham's proposal and removed the pro-
posal's reference to "civil rights or immunities. "177
Another of Bingham's complaints concerned the Bill's specific list of rights to
be protected from racial discrimination-which he assured his colleagues, "with
all [his] heart" should be law in every state. 178 But, the "remedy," he insisted, was
to be achieved "not by an arbitrary assumption of power, but by amending
the Constitution of the United States." 1 7 9 That, of course, was the intent of
Bingham's proposed amendment.8 0 Absent such an amendment, demanding the
176. Id.
177. See id. at 1366.
178. Id. at 1291.
179. Id.
180. Apparently, the draft of the Bill Bingham had before him had not yet been altered to protect
only citizens, but still contained the original protection for "inhabitants." Sponsors in both the House
and Senate had already agreed to limit the Bill to citizens, and Bingham spoke on the assumption that
the Bill would in fact be limited to citizens. See id. at 1292.
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equal protection of rights remained beyond the constitutional powers of
Congress.
But even if Congress was empowered to pass such a bill one final problem
remained. Proponents of the Bill had altered its original scope so that instead of
protecting the equal due process rights of all persons, the statute protected only
the due process rights of "citizens." This, to Bingham, was unjust. The rights of
due process were natural rights owed to every person, not just citizens.
Bingham's understanding of the rights of due process is illuminated in his expla-
nation below:
If this is to be the language of the bill, by enacting it are we not committing the
terrible enormity of distinguishing here in the laws in respect to life, liberty,
and property between the citizen and stranger within your gates? Do we not
thereby declare the States may discriminate in the administration of justice for
the protection of life against the stranger irrespective of race or color?
Sir, that is forbidden by the Constitution of your country. The great men who
made that instrument, when they undertook to make provision, by limitations
upon the power of this Government, for the security of the universal rights of
man, abolished the narrow and limited phrase of the old Magna Charta of five
hundred years ago, which gave the protection of the laws only to "free men"
and inserted in its stead the more comprehensive words, "no person;" thereby
obeying that higher law given by a voice out of heaven: "Ye shall have the
same law for the stranger as for one of your own country." Thus, in respect to
life and liberty and property, the people by their Constitution declared the
equality of all men, and by express limitation forbade the Government of the
United States from making any discrimination.
This bill sir, with all respect I submit, departs from that great law. The alien is
not a citizen. You propose to enact this law, you say, in the interests of the
freedmen. But do you propose to allow these discriminations to be made in
States against the alien and stranger? Can such legislation be sustained by rea-
son or conscience? With all respect to every gentleman who may be a sup-
porter of it, I ask, can it be sanctioned? Is it not as unjust as the unjust State
legislation you seek to remedy? Your Constitution says "no person," not "no
citizen," "shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property," without due process
of law."'
In short, narrowing the Bill to protect only citizens' rights of due process was
not only unjust, it contravened the language of the Due Process Clause itself.
Such rights ought to be equally enforced for all persons.
Bingham conceded that he had supported the Freedmen's Bureau Bill which,
he noted, "enumerate[d] the same rights ... and privileges that are enumerated in
the first section of this bill." 18 2 But the Freedmen's Bill, Bingham reminded his
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id.
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colleagues, was a war measure that's protections "shall cease and determine upon
the restoration of those insurrectionary States to their constitutional relations with
the United States, and the establishment therein of the courts."183 Regulating state
due process protection during peacetime, on the other hand, exceeded Congress's
authority:
[W]hen peace is restored; when the courts of justice are opened; when her
white-robed ministers take the golden scales into their hands, justice is to be
administered under the Constitution, according to the Constitution, and within
the limitation of the Constitution.
What is that limitation, sir? Simply this, that the care of the property, the liberty,
and the life of the citizen, under the solemn sanction of an oath imposed by your
Federal Constitution, is in the States, and not in the Federal Government. I have
sought to effect no change in that respect in the Constitution of the country. I
have advocated here an amendment which would arm Congress with the power
to compel obedience to the oath, and punish all violations by State officers of the
bill of rights, but leaving those officers to discharge the duties enjoined upon
them as citizens of the United States by that oath and by that Constitution ... .
"[C]entralized government, decentralized administration." That, sir, coupled
with your declared purpose of equal justice, is the secret of your strength and
power.
Sir, I have always so learned our dual system of Government by which our
own American nationality and liberty have been established and maintained. I
have always believed that the protection in time of peace within the States of
all the rights of person and citizen was of the powers reserved to the States.
And so I still believe.
Now, what does this bill propose? To reform the whole civil and criminal code
of every State government by declaring that there shall be no discrimination
between citizens on account of race or color in civil rights or in the penalties
prescribed by their laws. I humbly bow before the majesty of justice, as I bow
before the majesty of that God whose attribute it is, and therefore declare there
should be no such inequality or discrimination even in the penalties for crime;
but what power have you to correct it? That is the question.184
In sum, Bingham expressly viewed the Civil Rights Bill as an effort to enforce
the rights of due process as declared in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
He agreed that states ought to respect such rights and that Congress should have
the power to force recalcitrant states to do so. The Constitution, however, includ-
ing Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, did not give Congress any such
authority. Bingham's proposed due process amendment was meant to remedy
183. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
184. Id. at 1292-93.
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this. But even if Congress held such power, the Bill's current draft also assumed
federal power to enforce "civil rights and immunities" in the states. This violated
the Constitution's balance between state and federal authority, a balance
Bingham insisted remained a critical aspect of American liberty even in the after-
math of the Civil War.
To the consternation of the Bill's supporters, Bingham's speech was "exten-
sively published." 8 " If moderates like Bingham and Delano were willing to chal-
lenge Congress's authority to protect due process rights, this could dangerously
undermine House support for the Bill. Bingham's arguments would have to be
answered.
Later that same day, the House sponsor of the Bill, James Wilson, delivered his
reply. The thrust of his argument was simple: Congress had power to pass the
Civil Rights Act because Congress had implied power to enforce the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. According to Wilson:
The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BINGHAM] tells us in the protection of these
rights the citizen must depend upon the "honest purpose of the several States,"
and that the General Government cannot interpose its strong right arm to
defend the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and in possession of prop-
erty. In other words, if the States of this Union, in their "honest purpose," like
the honesty of purpose manifested by the southern States in times past, should
deprive the citizen, without due process of law, of life, liberty, and property,
the General Government, which can draw the citizen by the strong bond of al-
legiance to the battle-field, has no power to intervene and set aside a State law,
and give the citizen protection under the laws of Congress in the courts of the
United States; that at the mercy of the States lie all the rights of the citizen of
the United States; ... that revolted South Carolina may put under lock and key
the great fundamental rights belonging to the citizen, and we must be dumb;
that our legislative power cannot be exercised; that our courts must be closed
to the appeal of our citizens ....
He says that we cannot interpose in this way for the protection of rights. Can
we not? What are the great civil rights to which the first section of the bill
refers? I find in the bill of rights which the gentleman desires to have enforced
by an amendment to the Constitution that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." I understand that these consti-
tute the civil rights belonging to the citizens in connection with those which
are necessary for the protection and maintenance and perfect enjoyment of the
rights thus specifically named, and these are the rights to which this bill relates,
having nothing to do with subjects submitted to the control of the several
States.
185. See id. at 1837 (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
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And now, sir, we are not without light as to the power of Congress in relation
to the protection of these rights. In the case of Prigg vs. The Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania-and this it will be remembered was uttered in behalf of
slavery-I find this doctrine, and it is perfectly applicable to this case ....
Now, sir, in relation to the great fundamental rights embraced in the bill of
rights, the citizen being possessed of them in entitled to a remedy. That is the
doctrine of the law as laid down by the courts. There can be no dispute about
this. The possession of the rights by the citizen raises by implication the power
in Congress to provide appropriate means for their protection; in other words,
to supply the needed remedy.
The citizen is entitled to the right of life, liberty, and property. Now, if a State
intervenes and deprives him, without due process of law, of these rights, as has
been the case in a multitude of instances in the past, have we no power to make
him secure in his priceless possessions? ...
Now, I want to know whether these rights [enumerated in the bill] are any
greater than the rights which are included in the general term "life, liberty, and
property." And yet the gentleman admits by his instructions, and asks this
House to indorse his admission, that the General Government may secure to
citizens of the United States in every State the possession of these enumerated
rights. I take the gentleman's own instructions, and his argument in favor of
them, and I apply them as arguments in support of the report of the Judiciary
Committee. 1'
Wilson agreed with Bingham that the Civil Rights Bill constituted an effort to
enforce the rights of life, liberty, and property as declared by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. He also accepted Bingham's argument that
the unenumerated rights of state citizenship were reserved to the control of the
people in the states. Wilson insisted, however, that every right announced in the
Bill of Rights fell within either the scope of the federal Due Process Clause or
was necessary to protect the rights of due process. Indeed, Wilson believed that
referencing the "civil rights" of federal citizenship was no different than referenc-
ing the Fifth Amendment rights of due process. The Civil Rights Bill, he
explained, constituted an effort to enforce the enumerated due process rights of
national citizenship, not the unenumerated civil rights of state citizenship.
Like most radical Republicans, Wilson insisted Congress had implied power
to enforce the federal Due Process Clause against the states. In Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court found implied congressional power to enforce
the Fugitive Slave Clause.1 8 7 If Congress had implied power to enforce the
186. Id. at 1294-95 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
187. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 569 (1842).
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enumerated rights of slave owners, then it had no less power to enforce the enum-
erated rights of former slaves.
Wilson's insistence that the Bill protected nothing more than the due process
rights of life, liberty, and property was plausible only in regard to its enumerated
rights of person and property. The general terms "civil rights and immunities"
were not so easily cabined. Because other members echoed Bingham's concerns
about this language, 8 8 the Bill's proponents ultimately agreed to delete the dis-
puted terms. As Wilson explained,
Some members of the House thought, in the general words of the first section
in relation to civil rights, it might be held by the courts that the right of suffrage
was included in those rights. To obviate that difficulty and the difficulty grow-
ing out of any other construction beyond the specific rights named in the sec-
tion, our amendment strikes out all of those general terms and leaves the bill
with the rights specified in the section. 8
Having removed the language that arguably extended the Bill beyond the rights
of due process, the House now had sufficient votes to pass the due process based
Civil Rights Bill.190 They did so, however, without John Bingham support.191 For
Bingham, the effort would have to wait until after ratification of a constitutional
amendment empowering Congress to enforce the rights of due process.
More broadly, the above debates demonstrate that both critics and supporters
of the Civil Rights Bill- including its sponsors-understood the effort involved
enforcing the equal natural rights of individuals not to be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.
F. JOHNSON'S VETO AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDE
As he had done with the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, President Johnson vetoed the
Civil Rights Bill. Among his various grounds for rejecting the Bill, Johnson
insisted that it was inappropriate to so quickly grant freedmen the rights of
188. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1295-96 (1866) (statement of Rep. Latham).
189. Id. at 1367 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
190. Representative Samuel Shellabarger (R-OH) supported the Bill only because it had been altered
to protect only citizens-thus vindicating the strategy of narrowing the Bill-and because Congress was
not asserting any power to regulate the substance of the listed rights-requiring only that whatever their
substance under state law, these rights would be equally extended to all citizens regardless of race. See
id. at 1293 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger). According to Shellabarger:
[I]f this section did in fact assume to confer or define or regulate these civil rights, which are
named by the words contract, sue, testify, inherit, &c., then it would, as seems to me, be an
assumption of the reserved rights of the States and the people. But, sir, except so far as it confers
citizenship, it neither confers nor defines nor regulates any right whatever. Its whole effect is not to
confer or regulate rights, but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations
are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike without distinctions based on race
or former condition in slavery.
Id.
191. See id. at 1367 (reporting Bingham as a "nay" vote).
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citizenship-rights that arguably included suffrage. Even if such action were
appropriate, Congress had no constitutional power to enforce the Bill's listed
rights. 1 92
The Bill then returned to Congress for a possible override. Having been unable
to override Johnson's last veto, the Senate took no chances. On March 26, 1866,
the Senate voted to "retroactively" exclude New Jersey Democrat John Stockton.
Days later, the Senate successfully voted to override Johnson's veto-by a single
vote.193
In his speech responding to Johnson's veto, Senator Trumbull denied that the
rights of American citizenship necessarily included the rights of suffrage.
Franchise rights were political rights, and not the kind of civil rights covered by
the Bill. 194 In describing the rights that were protected by the Bill, Trumbull
moved back and forth between the natural rights of all persons and rights incident
to the status of citizenship:
But, sir, what rights do citizens of the United States have? To be a citizen of
the United States carries with it some rights; and what are they? They are those
inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or free men in all
countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill, and they belong to them in
all the States of the Union . . . . These rights belonging to the citizen, and
known as natural rights, are defined by Blackstone in his definition of civil lib-
erty to be:
"No other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws and no further,
as is necessary and expedient to the general advantage of the public. In this
definition of civil liberty it ought to be understood, or rather expressed, that the
restraints introduced by the law should be equal to all, or as much so as the na-
ture of things will admit."
"The equality of rights is the basis of a commonwealth" is said in a note to
Kent, and Kent himself, in speaking of these rights, says:
"The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy prop-
erty. These rights have been justly considered, and frequently declared, by the
people of this country to be natural, inherent, and inalienable."
What are they? "The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty,
and the right to acquire and enjoy property;" and these are declared to be inal-
ienable rights, belonging to every citizen of the United States, as such, no mat-
ter where he may be.19
192. See id. at 1679-81.
193. See id. at 1809; see also McKITRICK, supra note 38, at 323.
194. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
195. Id.
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Trumbull thus echoed his counterpart in the House, James Wilson, by arguing
that the Bill was limited to protecting the rights of national citizenship and claim-
ing that these rights were simply the natural rights of life, liberty, and property.
Trumbull also stressed the inherent principle of equality, whereby the rights of
due process "should be equal to all." As other scholars have noted, antebellum
due process theory commonly included an equality principle which demanded
that laws preventing the arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, and property should
be equally extended to all persons "as much as the nature of things will admit." 196
This equality principle appeared as early as the writing of William Blackstone,
and was embraced by antebellum abolitionists and key members of the Thirty-
Ninth Congress, including Trumbull, Wilson, Bingham, and others.1 97
On the other hand, there is a conceptual opaqueness in Trumbull's argument.
In determining the nature of the Bill's protected rights, Trumbull begins by citing
the classic definition of the natural rights of all persons. Trumbull then slides into
describing these rights of all persons as the "rights [] belonging to every citizen of
the United States, as such." The only way to make sense of this statement is to
understand that citizens, as persons, enjoy all the natural rights of every other
person (and more). However, limiting the Bill's protections of natural rights to
citizens-however awkward (and, to Bingham, unjust)-allowed defenders of
the Bill to claim authority under "citizenship" provisions like the Comity Clause
of Article IV.1 98 It also allowed Trumbull to invoke the government's implied
power to protect its citizens.1 99
As for President Johnson's claim that Congress lacked the power to enforce the
rights of personal security, liberty, and property, Trumbull was contemptuous:
Whatever may have been the opinion of the President at one time as to "good
faith requiring the security of the freedmen in their liberty and their property"
it is now manifest form the character of his objections to this bill that he will
approve no measure that will accomplish the object.2 00
Trumbull's speech was a mixed bag of natural and national rights, coupled
with an expansive view of Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth
196. See, e.g., Chapman & McConnell, supra note 27; McConnell, supra note 4, at 1036-37;
Williams, The One and Only, supra note 27. As Ryan Williams points out, the caveat "as much so as the
nature of things will admit" indicates an acceptance of common law distinctions in the protections of
life, liberty, and property, including rules regarding the acquisition and possession of property by
females and aliens. See Williams, Other Desegregation Decisions, supra note 27, at 530.
197. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("Civil
liberty, or the liberty which a person enjoys in society, is thus defined by Blackstone: 'Civil liberty is no
other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws and no further, as is necessary and expedient
for the general advantage of the public.... In this definition of civil liberty it ought to be understood ...
that the restraints introduced by the law should be equal to all, or as much so as the nature of things will
admit."').
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1761.
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Amendment. However persuasive these ideas were to a majority, the Senate
achieved the supermajority necessary to override Johnson's veto only on account
of having previously removed the likely opposing vote of New Jersey Democrat
John Stockton.20 1
The House, on the other hand, took the more traditional route of allowing
all their members to discuss the matter, if only briefly.20 2 Following Wilson's
announcement that only limited time would be allowed for debate,203 Representative
William Lawrence (R-OH) rose in support of overriding Johnson's veto. In a speech
that takes up several pages in the Congressional Globe,20 Lawrence detailed his rea-
sons for supporting congressional enforcement of the fights of due process.
After asserting Congress's power to bestow the rights of national citizen-
ship,205 Lawrence explained the nature of the rights protected by the Civil Rights
Bill. Following what had become a well-trod path by supporters of the Bill,
Lawrence focused on the natural rights of all persons as originally described in
the foundational documents of the Country and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment:
Legislative powers exist in our system to protect, not destroy, the inalienable
rights of men....
The Continental Congress of 1774, composed of delegates from twelve colo-
nies, in their Declaration of Rights, among other things, declared:
"That the inhabitants of the English colonies of North America, by the immu-
table laws of nature, the principle of the English constitution, and the several
charters or compacts, have the following rights:
"Resolved, That they are entitled to life, liberty, and property, and that they
have never ceded to any sovereign Power whatever a right to dispose of either
without their consent."
The Declaration of Independence affirms-
"That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
men."
The Constitution was established, as its preamble declares, to-
201. Despite those supporting the veto, such as Senator Garrett Davis (D-KY), see CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 181- 85 (1866), the final vote was 33-15, the requisite two-thirds majority
for a veto override. Id. at 1809.
202. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1828 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) ("It is not my
intention ... to allow any discussion... The bill has already been very thoroughly discussed.").
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1832-37 (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
205. Id. at 1832.
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"Promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty."
All the law-writers agree that every citizen has certain "absolute rights," which
include-
"The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to ac-
quire and enjoy property. These rights have been justly considered and fre-
quently declared by the people of this country to be natural, inherent, and
inalienable." . . .
The bill of rights to the national Constitution declares that:
"No person" . . . "shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right of personal se-
curity, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These are
rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights, there are
others, as the right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy
property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security of person and
property.
Now, there are two ways in which a State may undertake to deprive citizens of
these absolute, inherent, and unalienable rights: either by prohibitory laws, or
by a failure to protect any one of them.2 0 6
Lawrence then explored the conditions in the South and the existence of both
"prohibitory laws" and failures to enforce fundamental rights of life, liberty, and
property. 2 0 7
Lawrence's basic argument, as quoted above, was that all persons enjoy the
fundamental due process rights of life, liberty, and property. These rights also
include whatever is necessary to allow the enjoyment of such rights. The Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause expressly declares that citizens of the United
States enjoy these rights; 208 rights that Congress may enforce in cases in which
states have either passed laws violating the due process rights of citizens, or states
have failed to enforce laws protective of due process rights. Both problems
existed in the southern states under the Black Codes.
Lawrence ended his speech by addressing what he claimed was John
Bingham's essential objection to the Bill, the reference to "civil rights and
immunities" and the implication that Congress had authority over the content of
civil rights in the states:
206. Id. at 1832-33 (citations omitted).
207. See id. at 1833-35.
208. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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The speech of my distinguished colleague [Mr. BINGHAM, March 9] has been
extensively published in a mode to mislead the public judgment.
The great weight of his argument was leveled against a single provision of the
bill as it originally came from the Senate. In his speech he used this language:
"It [the bill] provides that-
'There shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among citizens
of the United States in any State or Territory of the United States, on account
of race, color, or previous condition of slavery."'
Now, sir, he placed upon this provision of the bill an interpretation different
form the committee who reported it. But for the purpose of obviating his objec-
tion this clause was stricken out and forms no part of the bill as it finally
passed.2 0 9
John Bingham's objections to the Civil Rights Bill, of course, went well
beyond that particular phrase. Bingham's central constitutional argument was
that Congress lacked the implied power to enforce the Due Process Clause. As
much as members like Lawrence might enjoy turning the once-hated Prigg doc-
trine against the South, Bingham was having none of it. In his speech, referenced
above by Representative Lawrence, Bingham insisted that enforcing provisions
of the Bill of Rights such as the Due Process Clause against the states required a
constitutional amendment. Bingham therefore refused to support the Civil Rights
Bill, even after its proponents removed the "civil rights and immunities" lan-
guage, and he refused to support the congressional override.2 1 0 Eventually,
Bingham would support a later version of the Bill, but only after the adoption of
an amendment protecting the due process rights of all persons and only after key
provisions of the bill were extended to all persons.2 1 1
In light of the above evidence, it appears that the due process reading of the Civil
Rights Act was broadly accepted in the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Congressmen
Trumbull, Wilson, Thayer, Delano, Cowan, Bingham, and Lawrence-key sponsors
and key objectors in both the Senate and the House-all described the Civil Rights
Bill as seeking to enforce the natural due process rights of life, liberty, and property.
Not only was this characterization never denied but it was also explained, in great
detail, by several congressmen. The only remaining question was whether Congress
had the constitutional power to enforce the Due Process Clause. Part III, below,
explores Bingham's effort to supply just such power.
209. CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., lst Sess. 1837 (1866).
210. Id. at 1861 (House votes to override Johnson's veto 122-41, with Bingham reported as "not
voting").
211. See, infra note 251 and accompanying text.
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III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
As the chronology of events in the Thirty-Ninth Congress illustrates, the Civil
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment proceeded along separate tracks.
Bingham took the lead in what became Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Wilson took the lead on the Civil Rights Act. The former was a
constitutional effort, the latter a legislative one. The Amendment and the Act
were premised on entirely different principles of constitutional authority.
Whereas Wilson insisted that the Act merely enforced already existing constitu-
tional provisions, Bingham insisted that the Act required a constitutional
amendment.
Despite their disagreement about the Constitution, both agreed about the nature
of the rights Congress sought to protect in the Civil Rights Act. The Act was not
an attempt to regulate the entire subject of civil rights in the states. Language that
might be misconstrued to that effect was removed. Nor was this an effort to
enforce rights bestowed upon individuals only at the moment they became citi-
zens (either of a state or of the United States). Instead, all agreed that the rights
protected by the Civil Rights Act were the natural rights of all persons-a recog-
nition which caused Bingham to object to the Act's exclusion of non-citizens
from its protection.
Throughout the debates, Bingham insisted that an amendment, which he had
already proposed, provided both the constitutional authority and the proper scope
of constitutional protection. After an initial round of debate and modification,
Bingham produced a draft with two provisions that ultimately became part of the
Fourteenth Amendment: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law" and "[t]he Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.2 12
Like the Civil Rights Act, Bingham's proposed amendment sought to protect
the rights of due process. However, unlike the Civil Rights Act, Bingham's
amendment guaranteed the rights of due process to all persons. Thus, Bingham's
amendment restored the original vision of the Civil Rights Act.
A. DISCONNECTING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT FROM THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES
CLAUSE
As noted in the opening of this Article, many scholars commonly assume that
the members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress intentionally drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment in a manner that constitutionalized the 1866 Civil Rights Act.2 13
Although this assumption seems intuitively correct, it faces several historical
problems. To begin with, members of the Joint Committee, which approved and
submitted Bingham's draft, expressly denied that it had been drafted to constitu-
tionalize the Civil Rights Act (more on this in a moment).214 Bingham himself
212. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5 (emphasis added).
213. See sources cited supra note 4.
214. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2896 (1866) (statement of Sen. Fessenden).
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never once mentioned the Civil Rights Act in his speeches supporting his drafts
of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor did his counterparts in the Senate.2 15 We also
know that, simply as a matter of chronology, Bingham's efforts to pass an amend-
ment began prior to the debates on the Civil Rights Act and that they proceeded
along an entirely different legislative track. Further, both the Civil Rights Act and
the Amendment were significantly amended prior to final passage, each for differ-
ent reasons and in response to different concerns.2 16 Finally, and most problemati-
cally for those seeking to equate the Act and the Amendment, the man who
drafted Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment refused to support the 1866
Civil Rights Act. All of this suggests that we should be careful before assuming
that the drafters intended the Amendment to constitutionalize the Act.
This does not mean, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment has no relation-
ship to the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that the
Amendment and the Act are linked in important ways. What we must avoid is the
assumption that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to constitu-
tionalize one particular version of the Civil Rights Act. This is not only false-
Bingham had no such intent-but it also misleadingly focuses our attention on
the temporary narrowed version of the Civil Rights Act passed in April 1866.
If one starts with the assumption that the framers sought to enforce the version
of the Act that protected citizens, one inevitably looks to provisions in the
Fourteenth Amendment that also protect citizens. The result might lead to some-
thing like the following chain of reasoning:
(1) The Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the 1866 version of the Civil
Rights Act;
(2) The 1866 version of the Civil Rights Act protected only citizens;
(3) The only provision in the Fourteenth Amendment that protects only citizens
is the Privileges or Immunities Clause;
(4) Therefore, the Privileges or Immunities Clause must be the provision that
constitutionalizes the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Such or similar logic has mistakenly informed almost all legal historical schol-
arship on the relationship between the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 17
Once we understand the due process roots of the original Civil Rights Act, this
breaks the commonly assumed link between the Act and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. We now know that key members, including the House spon-
sor (Representative Wilson) described the Civil Rights Act as an effort to enforce
the natural rights of due process; rights which are properly held by all persons,
215. See, e.g., id. at 1291-92 (statement of Rep. Bingham); id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard).
216. See id. at 1115-25 (tracking the amendments to the Civil Rights Bill).
217. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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not just citizens. We also know that the man who drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment (Representative Bingham) had no intention of constitutionalizing
the April 1866 version of the Civil Rights Act. Instead, Bingham drafted an
amendment that would authorize something like the original version of the Civil
Rights Act, one that protected the natural due process rights of all persons.
B. JOHN BINGHAM'S AMENDMENT
Two months prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act, John Bingham drafted
the initial version of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. As submitted to
Congress, the proposal read:
"The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citi-
zens in the several states (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property (5th
Amendment)."218
Bingham believed this language would require the states to protect both the
national rights of citizenship enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and the natural
rights of all persons declared by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
As Bingham explained to the House on February 26, "it has been the want of the
Republic that there was not an express grant of power in the Constitution to ena-
ble the whole people of every State, by congressional enactment, to enforce obe-
dience to these requirements of the Constitution." 2 1 9
On February 28, 1866, Bingham delivered a second speech that fleshed out his
ideas in more detail. Only days earlier, Congress had failed to override President
Johnson's federalism-based veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill.2 20 Fully aware
of the need to maintain moderate (and moderately conservative) support,
Bingham assured his colleagues that the Amendment did not "take away from
any State any right that belongs to it." 2 2 1 Its purpose was simply "to arm the
Congress of the United States ... with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it
stands in the Constitution today. It 'hath that extent-no more. "'222 Bingham
continued:
Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that the citi-
zens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States in the several States, and that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; but they say,
218. BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JoINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION:
39TH CONGRESS, 1865-1867, at 61 (1914).
219. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
220. President Johnson vetoed the Bill on February 19. See McKITRICK, supra note 38, at 287-88.
The next day, the Senate failed to override the veto by two votes, 30-18. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 943 (1866).
221. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
222. Id.
2018] 1449
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL
"We are opposed to its enforcement by act of Congress under an amended
Constitution, as proposed." That is the sum and substance of all the argument
that we have heard on this subject. Why are gentlemen opposed to the enforce-
ment of the bill of rights, as proposed?22 3
Following the debates on the Civil Rights Act, Bingham redrafted his proposed
Amendment.2 2 4 This second draft went far beyond Bingham's earlier proposal
and combined a number of proposed amendments which had been proposed
by different members at various points during the Thirty-Ninth Congress.2 2 5
Bingham's contribution became the Section One of the five-sectioned amend-
ment.2 2 6 For now, we are concerned only with Sections One and Five:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the provisions of this article.2 2 7
In his speech presenting the new draft to the House, Bingham explained that,
despite the new language, his goals remained the same: Congress must be
empowered to protect the enumerated rights of citizens and the natural rights of
all persons. According to Bingham:
The necessity for the first section of this amendment to the Constitution, Mr.
Speaker, is one of the lessons that have been taught to your committee and
taught to all the people of this country by the history of the past four years of
terrific conflict-that history in which God is, and in which He teaches the pro-
foundest lessons to men and nations. There was a want hitherto, and there
remains a want now, in the Constitution of our country, which the proposed
amendment will supply. What is that? It is the power in the people, the whole
people of the United States, by express authority of the Constitution to do that
223. Id. at 1089.
224. For a detailed discussion of John Bingham's first and second drafts of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see generally LASH, supra note 18, at 85-175.
225. See NELSON, supra note 90, at 48-58 (describing the various proposals and their combination
into a single amendment).
226. See KENDRICK, supra note 218, at 87. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, of which
Bingham was a member, prepared and submitted the amendment to the House and Senate. Although we
have no record of the Joint Committee's discussion, we do have a record of the votes and of which
member submitted which draft. From these notes, we know that John Bingham authored Section One.
227. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
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by congressional enactment which hitherto they have not had the power to do,
and have never even attempted to do; that is, to protect by national law the
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn
rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be
abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.22 8
In this passage, Bingham continues his longstanding practice of distinguishing
the natural rights of all persons from the rights of citizens of the United States.
The rights of equal protection are "the inborn rights of every person," whereas
"citizens of the Republic" enjoy an additional set of national privileges or
immunities. These privileges or immunities were not unlimited; they did not, for
example, include a national right of suffrage.2 2 9 In fact, according to Bingham,
the Amendment took "from no State any right that ever pertained to it," but sim-
ply granted Congress the previously missing power to enforce those national and
natural rights that states ought to have respected from the beginning. 23 0 As
Bingham explained:
That great want of the citizen and stranger, protection by national law from
unconstitutional State enactments, is supplied by the first section of this
amendment. That is the extent that it hath, no more; and let gentlemen answer
to God and their country who oppose its incorporation into the organic law of
the land.23 1
Here is Bingham's answer to the Civil Rights Act. With this amendment,
Congress would have power to enforce the rights of national citizenship (the Bill
of Rights) and the natural due process rights of all persons, even the stranger.
C. THE SPEECH OF JACOB HOWARD
As a matter of chance, it fell to Jacob Howard to introduce Bingham's provi-
sion to the Senate.2 3 2 Howard's speech has been the subject of exhaustive schol-
arly commentary for clues his words might yield for the meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. For now, I want to address only those aspects of
Howard's speech that relate to Congress's power to oppose the Black Codes
through legislation like the Civil Rights Act.
Howard began by defining the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States" to be protected under what was at that point the opening clause of
the Amendment. 23 3 Here, Howard pointed to rights specifically enumerated in the
federal Constitution, including the Comity Clause of Article IV and the first eight
228. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (emphasis
added).
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2543.
232. See id. at 2764-65 (statement of Sen. Howard) (explaining that William Fessenden had been
originally chosen to introduce the amendment to the Senate but that he had fallen ill at the last moment).
233. See id. at 2765. The citizenship clause would be added later. See id. at 2890-97.
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provisions in the Bill of Rights.234 Scholars vigorously disagree about the mean-
ing of Howard's reference to the Comity Clause and to cases like Corfield v.
Coryell. One view is that it was nothing more than a recognition that Article IV
equality rights were among the enumerated rights of citizens (along with the sub-
stantive rights of the Bill of Rights). Another view is that an undefined category
of local civil rights previously given equal protection under the Comity Clause
would now be transformed into unenumerated substantive national rights.235
Given that Bingham and the moderates had just successfully forced the removal
of the general term "civil rights" from the Civil Rights Act to avoid even suggest-
ing federal power over the substance of civil rights in the states, it seems unlikely
that Bingham would have proposed (or the moderates accepted) the latter. Absent
evidence to the contrary, Howard presumably shared the same understanding of
the Comity Clause as most everyone else in the Thirty-Ninth Congress: a provi-
sion providing out-of-state visitors equal access to a limited set of state-secured
rights. 236 These equal protection rights were as much the "privileges or immun-
ities of citizens of the United States" as were the substantive absolute rights of
the First Amendment.
But it is not necessary to engage at length this particular debate involving the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. The effort to inflate the significance of
Howard's reference to the Comity Clause has been driven by the assumption that
Bingham drafted the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause
to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act-an Act many scholars also assume rep-
resented an effort to enforce the citizenship rights of the Comity Clause. We now
know that Bingham did not read the Civil Rights Act in this manner. Neither, it
appears, did Jacob Howard.
Howard said nothing about the Civil Rights Act in his description of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Instead, Howard referenced the Black Codes-
the target of the Civil Rights Act-in his discussion of the proposed Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses:
234. After quoting the Comity Clause case, Corfield v. Coryell, and the first eight amendments, id. at
2765, Howard concluded:
Now, sir, here is a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of them secured by the second
section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which I have recited, some by the first eight amend-
ments of the Constitution; and it is a fact well worthy of attention that the course of decision of our
courts and the present settled doctrine is, that all these immunities, privileges, rights, thus guaran-
tied by the Constitution or recognized by it, are secured to the citizen solely as a citizen of the
United States and as a party in their courts. They do not operate in the slightest degree as a restraint
or prohibition upon State legislation. States are not affected by them, and it has been repeatedly
held the restriction contained in the Constitution against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation is not a restriction upon State legislation, but applies only to the
legislation of Congress.
Id.
235. See AMAR, THE BLL OF RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 185-87; LASH, supra note 18, at 155-60;
Barnett, supra note 22, at 175; Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection
Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 24-25 (2008); Hamburger, supra note
4, at 79-81.
236. See LASH, supra note 18, at 162-68.
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The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from
depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever
he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from
denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This abolishes all
class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting
one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.2 3 7
The "code" Howard refers to, of course, is the Black Codes. To Howard, it was
the last two clauses of Section One, and not the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
that abolished the Black Codes. This statement suggests that, to Howard at least, the
power to enact anti-Black Code legislation like the Civil Rights Act is found some-
where in the "last two clauses" of Section One (the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses) in combination with the powers granted by Section Five.23 8
Howard did not say which of the last two clauses empowered Congress to erad-
icate the Black Codes. However, we know from the Civil Rights debates that
members commonly viewed the Due Process Clause as carrying its own "equal-
ity" principle. We also know that John Bingham believed that enforcing the Due
Process Clause involved eradicating racially discriminatory Codes at least to the
extent that they deprived persons of their natural due process rights of life, liberty,
and property.2 3 9
On the other hand, even if Bingham believed that enforcement of the Due
Process Clause authorized Congress to prohibit certain forms of racial discrimi-
nation, he and the Committee may have believed it was safest to expressly declare
this implicit principle of equal due process. It also is possible, as scholars have
recently argued,2 4 0 that the Equal Protection Clause had an altogether separate
task: where due process required laws that secured all persons in their equal rights
of due process, the Equal Protection Clause (in combination with Section Five)
empowered Congress to ensure those rights were actually, and equally, enforced.
For now, it is enough to recognize that Howard appears to have shared
Bingham's view that abolishing the Black Codes involved enforcing the natural
rights of "all persons," and not the special rights of "citizens of the United
States."
237. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) (emphasis added).
238. Howard's statement seems to contradict claims that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
viewed the Privileges or Immunities Clause as authorizing anti-Black Code legislation like the Civil
Rights Act. This has led some scholars to embrace creative readings of Howard's statement. Christopher
Green, for example, argues that Howard did not mean to link power to prohibit the Black Codes with the
"last two clauses" of Section One. Green asserts that the word "this" in the above Howard quote actually
refers to Section One as a whole and not to the "last two clauses" of Section One. See GREEN, supra note
4, at 50; Green, supra note 235, at 28-29. Green's reading is, at best, counterintuitive. It also conflicts
with everything we know about how members viewed the rights of the Civil Rights Act. In short, the
most natural reading of Howard's speech preserves the structure of the paragraph, coincides with the
views of the Amendment's drafter-and Howard's colleague on the Joint Committee-John Bingham,
and fits with how supporters and critics viewed the Civil Rights Act.
239. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
240. See Green, supra note 235, at 28-29.
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D. POST-RATIFICATION REPASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The 1870 reenactment of the 1866 Civil Rights Act has gone mostly unnoticed
and completely unanalyzed in Fourteenth Amendment historical scholarship.
This omission is surprising because of the important role legal historians assign
to the Civil Rights Act in determining the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Passed only two years after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, many of the same members of Congress were involved in the pas-
sage of the original Civil Rights Act, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
reenacted Civil Rights Act.241
Of course, as is true for all postratification evidence, the further removed from
the time of ratification, the less the evidence sheds light on original understand-
ing. That reason alone may justify legal historians' disregard of the reenacted
Civil Rights Act. On the other hand, if during the reenactment debates, members
made statements calling into question the due process understanding of the origi-
nal Act, then this would at least be some evidence of a contrary understanding. In
this case, however, the evidence strongly supports an original due process under-
standing of the Civil Rights Act.
Recall that the original version of the Act declared the following:
[T]he inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any previous con-
dition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding.2" 2
Because a number of members doubted that Congress had power under the
Thirteenth Amendment to guarantee all persons their due process rights, propo-
nents narrowed the Bill so that it protected only "citizens." John Bingham
opposed the amended bill on the dual grounds that it would take a constitutional
amendment to protect the rights of life, liberty, and property, and that all persons
deserved such protection, not just citizens.
241. Fifteen senators voted in all three final passage votes. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1854 (1866) (Civil Rights Act on April 9, 1866); id. at 3042 (Fourteenth Amendment on June 8, 1866);
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3809 (1870). Among them were Senators Anthony, Chandler,
Harris, Morrill, Pomeroy, Trumbull, and Williams. Similarly, twenty-eight representatives voted in the
final votes of these bills in House, most notably Representatives Davis, Griswold, Jenckes, Lawrence,
and Pomeroy. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1861 (1866) (Civil Rights Act on April 9, 1866);
id. at 3149 (Fourteenth Amendment on June 13, 1866); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3884 (1870)
(repassage of the Civil Rights Act on May 27, 1870). Representatives Bingham was involved in all three
bills, of course, but voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See supra note 191.
242. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 363 (1866) (emphasis added).
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Following the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
Congress revisited the issue. Buried within the provisions of an 1870 bill "to
enforce the fifteenth amendment" (the "Enforcement Act") were the following
two provisions:
Sec. 15. And be it further enacted, That all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the
United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all law and proceedings for the security of
person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishments, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding ....
SEC. 17. And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication,
passed April 9, 1866, is hereby reenacted; and said act, except the first and sec-
ond sections thereof, is hereby referred to and made a part of this act; and sec-
tion fifteen and section sixteen hereof shall be enforced according to the
provisions of said act.243
With the exception of the right to buy and sell American real estate,244 Section
Fifteen extended all of the rights of the 1866 Civil Rights Act to "all persons."
Section Seventeen formally reenacted the citizenship-based 1866 Act and incor-
porated into the Enforcement Act the same enforcement provisions of the Civil
Rights Act.
As the debates over the Enforcement Act went forward, members described
the "all persons" section as an effort to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and
its guarantee to all persons the rights of life, liberty, and property-rights pro-
tected by the original version of the Civil Rights Act. For example, in response to
Senator Eugene Casserly's (D-CA) criticism of the Bill's enforcement provisions,
243. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3562 (1870) (emphasis added).
244. The issue of noncitizen real estate rights came up during the original debates. See CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (acknowledging that Congress could not
force states to grant real estate rights to noncitizens, but that Congress could make people citizens and
then require states to grant those citizens real estate rights). I will discuss this issue in a final section of
this Article. Although all persons (including noncitizens) enjoyed the equal natural due process right to
acquire and possess property, see infra note 278, the "equality" aspect was subject to the caveat "as
much as the nature of things will admit." See supra note 196; see also Williams, The One and Only,
supra note 27, at 460-77 (noting that Reconstruction-era conceptions of due process incorporated
common law distinctions). Common law conceptions of due process property rights accepted
distinctions between citizens and noncitizens, with noncitizens usually allowed to acquire but not "hold"
real property. This meant that real property was possessed "subject to office" (government intervention).
This distinction between the property rights of aliens and citizens likely influenced the decision to
remove real estate rights from the "all persons" section of the 1870 version of the Civil Rights Act. See
infra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
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Senator John Pool (R-NC) pointed out that these provisions "are copied from the
civil rights bill."2 45 To this, Senator Allen Thurman (D-OH) responded:
There is not one word in the civil rights bill on the subject of the right to vote.
There is not one provision in it intended to secure or protect anybody in the
right to vote. The right to vote is wholly outside of that bill ....
It deals simply with rights of life, liberty, person, property. It does not touch
political rights at all, has nothing in the world to do with the elective
franchise.246
Objections to the Enforcement Act tended to focus on whether the Fifteenth
Amendment empowered Congress to prohibit private interference with the right
to vote.247 Unlike the original debates over the Civil Rights Act, no one argued
this time that Congress lacked the constitutional power to reenact the Civil Rights
Act and extend its protections to "all persons.,"248 Also, where proponents of the
original version of the Civil Rights Act had initially characterized the Act as an
enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment,2 4 9 both Republicans and Democrats
in 1870 uniformly described the civil rights provisions as an effort to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, although John Bingham had previously
opposed what he viewed as an unauthorized attempt to enforce the rights of due
process, this time, Bingham helped lead the effort to pass the Act and extend its
provisions to all persons.
On May 27, 1870, John Bingham introduced the Enforcement Act to the
House with the above-quoted sections reenacting and extending the rights of the
original Civil Rights Act. Bingham noted that, in addition to enforcing the right
to vote, "the Senate amendment contained various provisions for the enforcement
245. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 470 (1870) (statement of Sen. Pool).
246. Id. (statement of Sen. Thurman). Senator Casserly responded by denying the constitutionality of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act:
I am discussing this bill as a bill to enforce the fifteenth amendment. The civil rights bill had another
object. Yet I am surprised to hear that there are such provisions in that act. I do not think anybody
has ever thought of enforcing them, or ever supposed them to be valid or constitutional....
[Is it a proper thing to repeat that error now?
Id.
247. See, e.g., id. at 473 (colloquy between Sens. Carpenter and Casserly).
248. At most, members suggested that extending these rights to all persons was a complicated subject
requiring more discussion. See, e.g., id. at 475 (statement of Sen. Casserly) ("I shall not say a word in
reply to the speech of the Senator from Nevada [Mr. STEWART] on the Chinese question in California,
made by him after I arose, when I yielded to him to say a word in reply to the Senator from Oregon, [Mr.
WILLIAMS.] That is a question of considerable dimensions, which, as even he seems to be conscious, is
by no means an easy one to deal with. I trust that the Senate will at this time confine itself to the subject
which it has before it-the consideration of the bills to enforce the fifteenth amendment.").
249. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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of certain sections of the fourteenth article of the amendments to the
Constitution.'"250
Notice how Bingham phrased his introduction. The additional provisions were
not efforts to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment (a theory he originally rejected
and which no one now proposed), nor did Bingham describe the effort as simply
"reenacting" the Civil Rights Act (a bill he originally opposed as unconstitu-
tional). Instead, Bingham presented the Bill as if this were a new and unprece-
dented effort to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the 1870 version of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act was the first congressional effort to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Although some Democrats opposed the Bill, they also recognized that the civil
rights provisions were an attempt to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.2 51
Although some members argued that the Bill in its entirety violated rights re-
served to the states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,252 no one claimed
that the civil rights provisions exceeded Congress's power under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The lack of such an objection is all the more significant in light of the
Enforcement Act's extension of most of the Civil Rights Act to all persons.
Neither the Citizenship Clause nor the Privileges or Immunities Clause authorizes
a guarantee of equal rights to noncitizens. These were the rights of life, liberty,
and property-the natural rights of all persons originally protected by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and now guaranteed against state abridge-
ment by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. It was the failure of
the original Civil Rights Act to extend these natural rights to all persons that trig-
gered the objections of John Bingham. It is altogether fitting, therefore, that
Bingham introduced to the House the first national effort to protect the due pro-
cess rights of all persons against state abridgement-rights that entered the
Constitution by the hand of Bingham himself.
250. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3871 (1870) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
251. See id. at 3873 (statement of Rep. Kerr) ("The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BINGHAM] says that
this bill is intended for the purpose of executing the fourteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Yet one section only has any logical relation to the fourteenth article
of amendment, that is the fourteenth section; and one section alone has direct and logical reference to the
enforcement of the fifteenth article of amendment; and that is all."); id. at 3874 (statement of Rep. Beck)
("The bill which left us was simply a bill to enforce the fifteenth amendment, and we had a right to
suppose the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BINGHAM] would insist on maintaining it in that form; instead of
that it is abandoned, and he urges us to pass this bill of abominations hatched and concocted in the
conference committee-room, in part, at least, which pretends to reenact the infamous civil rights bill,
and enforce the fourteenth amendment as well as the fifteenth amendment. We are required to swallow it
all at one dose.").
252. See id. app. at 354 (statement of Sen. Hamilton) (citing the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
together as establishing the principle of enumerated federal power and protecting the reserved
sovereignty of the states); id. at 431 (statement of Rep. Swan) (same).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
As I mentioned in the Introduction, the 1866 Civil Rights Act plays a signifi-
cant role in scholarship relating to the meaning of both the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Thirteenth Amendment scholars, for example, often
insist that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 represents an enforcement of the
Thirteenth Amendment.253 Fourteenth Amendment scholars, on the other hand,
often use the Act as a guide to understanding the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.2 54 The history presented in this
Article problematizes both of these claims.
To begin with, advocates of the original version of the Civil Rights Act initially
tried to argue that the Act represented an appropriate enforcement of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Because "true freedom" for any person required the pro-
tection of their natural rights of life, liberty, and property, they argued, the Civil
Rights Act was an appropriate effort to enforce the freedom guaranteed by the
Thirteenth Amendment. Although their fellow members understood that the
effort involved protecting the natural rights of due process, many of them doubted
Congress's power to enforce such rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. The
failure to convince a sufficient number of their colleagues prompted an alteration
in the Act's original language which abandoned the idea of protecting all free per-
sons and instead protected only free citizens. This alteration opened the door to a
variety of additional sources of potential congressional authority, from the state-
citizen rights of Article IV's Comity Clause to the federal rights of American citi-
zens under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The alteration of the Act signaled the advocates' realization that a majority of
members would not accept the original version of the Civil Rights Act that was
authorized solely by the Thirteenth Amendment. No doubt, some members did
have a sufficiently broad view of the abolition amendment, but because too many
other members did not, proponents decided not to go forward with the original
bill. Once altered to protect only citizens, James Wilson exhorted his colleagues
to accept the Bill not as an enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment, but as
an enforcement of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause-a right of
American citizens. The uncoupling of the Civil Rights Act from the Thirteenth
Amendment is especially evident during the repassage debates of 1870. Not a sin-
gle member mentioned the Thirteenth Amendment. Instead, everyone viewed the
issue as one involving the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. In short,
253. Even without postadoption evidence, there is good reason to doubt this claim. As the first half of
this Article points out, advocates of the Civil Rights Act began by relying on the Thirteenth
Amendment, but later added a variety of additional possible sources of authority, including the Fifth
Amendment, the Republican Guarantee Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the
Naturalization Clause. It is unlikely that, at the time of the Act's original passage, any single source of
authority represented the authority for the Civil Rights Act. Following the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, when reenacting the Act Congress cited no source of authority except for the Fourteenth
Amendment.
254. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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the historical evidence tilts heavily against a Thirteenth Amendment reading of
the reenacted Civil Rights Act.
The evidence strongly supports, on the other hand, a due process reading of the
Civil Rights Act. Many key members of Congress described the 1866 version of
the Civil Rights Act as an effort to enforce the natural rights of due process, and
this seems to be prima facie evidence of a common due process reading of the
Act. Indeed, with both sponsors and critics accepting this reading, it is difficult to
see how an argument can be made against a due process reading of the Act.
Although scholars often point to the many instances in which members associated
the rights of the Comity Clause with the Civil Rights Act, they have missed the
full context of those references. For example, when men like Trumbull discussed
the Comity Clause and cases like Corfield v. Coryell, they were careful to deny
that the Act was an effort to enforce the Comity Clause. The reference was meant
only to illustrate how some of the rights of Corfield ought to be considered among
the natural rights of American citizens. Outside of Congress, both judges and po-
litical commentators agreed that the Act was not an effort to enforce the rights of
the Comity Clause. The reason was clear to members of Congress (and was
repeatedly discussed): the Comity Clause provided visiting citizens equal access
to a limited set of rights that states might (but might not) grant their own citizens.
It had nothing to do with those rights states must grant their own citizens (the sub-
ject of the Civil Rights Act).
Additionally, scholars often describe the Privileges or Immunities Clause as
somehow authorizing legislation like the Civil Rights Act. 255 The evidence pre-
sented in this Article suggests otherwise. Whereas the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protects only citizens, the original and final versions of the Civil Rights
Act protect all persons. Although the Civil Rights Act was temporarily narrowed,
the debates overwhelmingly reflect a consistent understanding that the protected
rights were the natural rights of all persons. The temporary focus on citizens
reflected a perceived lack of constitutional authority, not a belief that these rights
belonged only to citizens. Wilson, Bingham, Thayer, and others could not have
been clearer on this issue: the Act protected the rights covered by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause which, by their nature, belonged to all
persons.
This suggests that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment car-
ried a meaning that both critics and supporters would have recognized as author-
izing legislation like the Civil Rights Act. That the framer of Section One, John
Bingham, expressly held a due process understanding of the Civil Rights Act sim-
ply adds additional (and important) authority.
Securing one's life, liberty, and property required a minimum set of basic legal
process rights; rights that remained unsecure unless a person had the right to
make and enforce contracts, sue, and be sued. All persons-not just citizens-
had an equal right to such security. Bingham therefore objected to the 1866 Act's
255. See supra note 4.
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failure to protect noncitizens. He insisted, however, that protecting such rights
required a constitutional amendment. Everyone in Congress, and everyone fol-
lowing the debates from outside, would have understood Bingham's proposed
"Due Process Amendment" as authorizing legislation like the Civil Rights Act.
Bingham certainly did, which is why Bingham opposed the Civil Rights Act prior
to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment but supported the enactment of an
extended version-one protecting all persons-after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Although we have limited evidence of the public's understanding of the precise
relationship between the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, the
evidence we have nevertheless supports a due process reading of the Act. For
example, even if one discounts evidence of the framers' intent, we know that
John Bingham embraced the language of the Due Process Clause because he
believed that this language, in conjunction with Section Five, authorized legisla-
tion like the Civil Rights Act. We know that many of his colleagues also associ-
ated the listed rights of the Civil Rights Act with the natural due process rights of
all persons. Finally, we know that after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, members of Congress continued to associate the majority of rights
listed in the Civil Rights Act with the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the
rights of "all persons." Even if not dispositive, all of this is evidence of a widely-
shared understanding of a relationship between the Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
We also know that the debates in Congress were well published in newspapers
throughout the country, and that members of the public were following those
debates.25 6 Public critics of the Civil Rights Act understood it was an effort to
enforce the rights of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and they pub-
lished essays critical of the effort in national newspapers. Bingham's criticism of
the Act as an unconstitutional effort to enforce the Due Process Clause was not
only independently published and distributed, but his arguments were expressly
relied upon by politicians in their public explanations of their vote.2 57 Anyone fol-
lowing the debates over the Civil Rights Act, and Bingham's role in it, would
understand that Bingham's proposed "Due Process Clause" amendment sought to
authorize legislation like the Civil Rights Act. In short, there is sufficient evi-
dence to think that the due process reading of the Civil Rights Act, and the Civil
256. In 1866, Congressional debates were a significant source of newspaper content. This includes
not only the national papers like the Herald Tribune, but also much smaller regional papers which
reprinted content from their larger siblings. Both white and African American constituencies closely
followed developments in the Reconstruction Congress. This was especially true in 1866 as the country
looked forward to a congressional election that would determine the direction of Reconstruction policy.
See LASH, supra note 18, at 177-79.
257. See Letter from Mr. H. J. Raymond, EVENING PosT, Apr. 21, 1866, at 3 ("Some weeks ago Mr.
Bingham, of Ohio, proposed an amendment to the Constitution intended to confer upon Congress the
right to enact precisely such a law as this. He held, and the great body of those who have now voted for
this bill then held with him, that without such an amendment Congress had no authority whatever to pass
such a law.").
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Rights Act reading of the Due Process Clause, informed at least some members
of the public's understanding of the Act and the Amendment.
That said, one must acknowledge the frustratingly vague and varied discus-
sions of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment which took place
during the political debates of 1866. Sometimes the Act and the Amendment
were described as protecting the equal rights of citizens, without any analysis as
to why this was true or which clause accomplished the protection. It is, of course,
literally true that the Civil Rights Act by its terms protects the equal rights of citi-
zens. It is also true that the Fourteenth Amendment would have been understood
as authorizing the Civil Rights Act. But there are a variety of ways members of
the public might have believed the text accomplished this result. Some might
have believed the Citizenship Clauses accomplished this result by themselves, or
perhaps by way of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, or (as I believe most
likely) by way of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In the end, the
political debates by themselves do not provide enough specific analysis of the Act
and the Amendment to allow for a conclusion one way or another.
On the other hand, nothing in the public political debates of 1866 is inconsis-
tent with a due process reading of the Civil Rights Act and a Civil Rights Act
reading of the Due Process Clause. Under such a reading, the Due Process Clause
would have guaranteed the equal right of citizens to protections like those found
in the Civil Rights Act. It would have been equally true that a Bingham-like read-
ing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause also would have guaranteed the equal
rights of citizens to protections like those found in the Civil Rights Act. The Fifth
Amendment, as one of the enumerated protections in the Bill of Rights, fell
within Bingham's understanding of the Privileges or Immunities of citizens of
the United States. 258 It was because such rights should also be extended to nonci-
tizens as well that Bingham added a separate clause declaring the due process
rights of all persons.
We know that one of John Bingham's central goals was passing an amendment
that would allow federal enforcement of the Bill of Rights against state abridge-
ment. The failure of the original Constitution to allow such enforcement was, in
his view, the "want of the Republic." 25 9 Bingham accomplished this goal by way
of the second sentence of Section One, which declares that "[n]o State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States."2 60
To Bingham, the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
included the rights listed in the Bill of Rights. 2 61 As Jacob Howard explained, this
258. For fuller elaboration on this point in addition to the evidence cited in this Article, see LASH,
supra note 18, at 246-52 (discussing Bingham's view that "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" included the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights).
259. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
260. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
261. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) ("I repel the
suggestion made here in the heat of debate, that the committee or any of its members who favor this
proposition seek in any form to mar the Constitution of the country, or take away from any State any
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provision obligated the states to protect the rights enumerated in the federal
Constitution, including all of the rights listed in the first eight amendments.2 62
Public commentary during ratification and immediately following ratification
also linked the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States with
enumerated rights such as those listed in the first eight amendments.263
If this was in fact the original understanding of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, then this means that the rights of the 1866 Civil Rights Act were secured
in two different ways. First, the rights of the Fifth Amendment, including the Due
Process Clause, were secured for U.S. citizens by way of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. All of the enumerated rights of U.S. citizens would have
counted as privileges or immunities protected against state action. Although non-
citizens might not enjoy all the constitutionally enumerated privileges or immun-
ities of American citizenship, the separate Due Process Clause ensured that they
too would enjoy at least the natural right to being secure in life, liberty, and
property.
The 1866 Civil Rights Act protected rights belonging to both American citi-
zens and "all persons," which explains why commentary both inside and outside
of Congress sometimes associated the Civil Rights Act with the rights of citizens
and sometimes with the rights of all persons. Both references reflected noncon-
flicting understandings of the basic rights of due process and, ultimately, the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 64
On the other hand, members commonly referred to the Fifth Amendment due
process rights of citizens, which reminds us that the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States included those rights that were enumerated in the
federal Constitution. Elsewhere, I have explored evidence suggesting that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause referred exclusively to enumerated constitutional
rights-including, but not limited to, those rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. 26 5 A common objection to this reading is that it failed to account for the
right that belongs to it, or from any citizen of any State any right that belongs to him under that
Constitution. The proposition pending before the House is simply a proposition to arm the Congress of
the United States, by the consent of the people of the United States, with the power to enforce the bill of
rights as it stands in the Constitution today. It 'hath that extent-no more."').
262. Id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard) ("Such is the character of the privileges and immunities
spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To these privileges and
immunities, whatever they may be-for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent
and precise nature-to these should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight
amendments of the Constitution.. . .").
263. See generally LASH, supra note 18, at 197-234.
264. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2502 (1866) (statement of Rep. Raymond) ("The
principle of the first [section], which secures an equality of rights among all the citizens of the United
States, has had a somewhat curious history. It was first embodied in [the Bingham amendment tabled in
February] .... Next it came before us in the form of a bill, by which Congress proposed to exercise
precisely the powers which that amendment was intended to confer, and to provide for enforcing against
State tribunals the prohibitions against unequal legislation. . . . I have at all times declared myself
heartily in favor of the main object which that bill was intended to secure. I was in favor of securing an
equality of rights to all citizens of the United States, and of all persons within their jurisdiction .... ").
265. See generally LASH, supra note 18.
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1866 Civil Rights Act-an act many historians believed was authorized after the
fact by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause.266 If, however, it was the Due Process Clause that authorized legislation
like the Civil Rights Act, this removes an objection to reading the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as protecting only those rights actually enumerated in the fed-
eral Constitution.
A. ON DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
One complicating factor is the relationship between the rights of the Civil
Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. As explained earlier, Bingham and
many of his colleagues understood Due Process as containing a principle of equal
due process-one seemingly sufficient to authorize passage of legislation like the
Civil Rights Act. The public, however, may well have viewed the Equal
Protection Clause as providing specific textual authorization for equal due pro-
cess rights legislation like the 1870 version of the Civil Rights Act.267 If so, this
view cuts against both a Thirteenth Amendment and a "Privileges or Immunities"
reading of the Civil Rights Act. On the other hand, this possibility complicates
our ability to specify how the public understood the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.
Although this is a possible public understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause, there is no evidence that it was the common understanding. To begin,
there is too much evidence in the historical record indicating the Due Process
Clause was understood as including an equality principle to believe that the
Equal Protection Clause extinguished this common understanding of due process.
More likely, the Equal Protection Clause would have been understood as support-
ive of this traditional understanding of due process. For example, it is possible
that the Equal Protection Clause expressly communicated a broadly accepted
implied aspect of due process. 2 68 If so, then the Equal Protection Clause adds
nothing other than clarity to the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment. A second pos-
sibility involves reading the Equal Protection Clause as demanding the equal pro-
tection of those "equal laws" already demanded by the Due Process Clause. 2 69 If
this represents the common understanding, then the Due Process Clause may
have communicated a body of equal due process rights, and the Equal Protection
Clause communicated a duty to equally enforce such rights.270
266. See supra note 4.
267. There is some evidence they did. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866)
(statement of Rep. Stevens) (describing the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of equal rights for all
men as echoing the Civil Rights Act).
268. See, e.g., Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 22.
269. See Green, supra note 235, at 74; see generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION (2011) (considering the historical evidence of a theory of "state
neglect" as a trigger for congressional enforcement power).
270. Failure of the southern states to equally enforce laws in cases involving freedmen was a serious
and recognized problem in the Reconstruction Congress. See FONER, supra note 10, at 199 (discussing
the rise of the post-civil war Black Codes in the South).
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Whatever the precise relationship of the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause, the historical evidence seems to confirm the Supreme Court's
recognition of an equality principle as an inherent aspect of due process.27 1 John
Bingham understood both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause as declaring due process rights equally enjoyed by all persons. The
Fourteenth Amendment did not introduce an equality principle to due process;
the right was already understood as containing an equality principle. The
Supreme Court in Bolling v. Sharpe simply echoed the Reconstruction-era under-
standing of due process, under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.27 2
B. DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO POSSESS AND ACQUIRE PROPERTY
A potential objection to the due process reading of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
involves the Act's requirement that states grant citizens the same right to "inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property ... as is enjoyed
by white citizens."273 This protection was not extended to noncitizens in the 1870
extension of the Civil Rights Act. This might indicate that at least this section of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act cannot be viewed as protecting a natural right of all per-
sons.2 74 As explained below, I do not think this is the best understanding of either
the 1866 or 1870 version of the Act. The common law understanding of due pro-
cess property rights explains why acts distinguishing the real property rights of
citizens and noncitizens fall comfortably within the Reconstruction-era under-
standing of the rights of due process.
According to the antebellum Republican conception of due process, both aliens
and citizens held the natural due process rights of life, liberty, and property.275
This includes natural rights associated with acquiring and possessing real prop-
erty. This is an idea that can be traced back to the Lockean labor theory of prop-
erty, whereby all persons have the natural right to acquire property and be
protected against arbitrary deprivation.2 76 In theory, the natural right to acquire
271. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954).
272. Whether Bolling represents a proper application of the original or Reconstruction understanding
of Due Process is a more difficult question, and one beyond the scope of this Article.
273. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866).
274. Christopher Green has made a version of this argument. See GREEN, supra note 4, at 44 ("the
Civil Rights Act covers land-ownership rights traditionally denied, with little or no controversy, to
aliens").
275. See WLLIAM B. GLIDDEN, CONGRESS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: ENFORCING LIBERTY
AND EQUALITY IN THE STATES 51 (2013) ("The evidence indicates that the Republicans understood that
aliens lawfully residing in the country and entitled to enjoy the same civil rights as citizens.... Bingham
objected at the time that enacting a federal civil rights statute that even by implication tolerated local
government discriminations against aliens would constitute a violation of the fifth amendment, which
says that 'no person' shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Distinguishing 'in the laws in respect to life, liberty, and property between the citizen and stranger . .. is
forbidden by the Constitution."'); Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 34, at 52 ("M]any state constitutions
specifically protected as a matter of state positive law the 'natural and inalienable rights' of the people,
among which was often the right 'to defend' life and liberty and 'to protect' property.").
276. See Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the
Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 275-76
(1988) ("[T]he need to protect rights of possession was seen to follow from the rights of acquisition.
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real property existed regardless of citizenship, as in the case of a newly arrived
settler who tills otherwise unoccupied and unclaimed land.277 Early American ju-
risprudence embraced this idea, with antebellum descriptions of due process
rights consistently including the natural right of all persons to "acquire and pos-
sess property. 278 This included some of the earliest constitutional theorists (and
abolitionists).27 9
Although, under common law, aliens were restricted in the manner in which
they could acquire real property, even aliens enjoyed the presumed right to ac-
quire real property "until office found"-a legally sanctioned action by the gov-
ernment to reclaim title to the land.28 0 This cloud over the title disappeared at the
time of naturalization. As Justice Joseph Story wrote in Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee,
It is clear by the common law, that an alien can take lands by purchase, though
not by descent, or, in other words he cannot take by the act of law, but he may
by the act of the party . . . . [J]n the language of the ancient law, the alien has
the capacity to take, but not to hold, lands, and they may be seized into the
hands of the sovereign.281
As of 1868, the concept of due process of law incorporated the same distinc-
tions embraced by the common law.2 82 This meant that both citizens and aliens
enjoyed the natural right to "acquire and possess" real and personal property, sub-
ject to the distinctions acknowledged at common law. This explains why the
1866 Civil Rights Act demanded citizens be granted the equal right to "hold" real
property, 283 but the 1870 extension demanded only that all persons enjoy the gen-
eral natural rights of "person and property. It also explains why Bingham
would oppose the "citizen only" 1866 version but support the 1870 version,
'The personal right to acquire property, which is a natural right,' Madison stated late in life, 'gives to
property, when acquired, a right to protection, as a social right."' (quoting 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 361 (G. Hunt ed., 1904))); Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment:
How Does Lockean Legal Theory Assist in Interpretation?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1, 2 (2010)
[hereinafter McConnell, Natural Rights] ("According to Locke, natural rights are the rights human
beings have in the state of nature, before the creation of civil or political society. '[E]very man,' Locke
wrote, 'has a property in his own person,' along with the products of his labor and that which he mixes
with his labor." (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 111 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1689))).
277. See McConnell, Natural Rights, supra note 276.
278. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
111 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1689).
279. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *372; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *54; see generally Polly J.
Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the Relative Autonomy
Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 152, 163 (1999).
281. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 619-20 (1813); see also Thompson, 263 U.S. at 217 n.3.
282. See Williams, The One and Only, supra note 27.
283. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
284. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (emphasis added).
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which omitted the right to hold real property but otherwise guaranteed "all per-
sons ... the same right in every State and Territory in the United States to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, ... and to full and
equal benefit of all law and proceedings for the security of person and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens."
In short, statutes enforcing the rights of both citizens and aliens to acquire and
possess property fall within the general power to enforce the rights of due pro-
cess, even if those statutes distinguish the manner in which citizens and aliens
"hold" real property.
CONCLUSION
Legal historians have rightly looked to the 1866 Civil Rights Act for clues to
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, scholars have
tended to focus on the temporary version of the Act passed in April of 1866. By
doing so, they have missed important clues regarding the nature of the rights
Congress originally sought to protect-and ultimately did protect-in the final
version passed in 1870.
The 1866 Civil Rights Act began as an effort to secure to all persons the due
process rights of life, liberty, and property. This initial effort was postponed due
to a perceived lack of constitutional power to enforce the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. To cobble together a sufficient number of votes, proponents
trimmed the initial Act to protect only United States citizens. Those members
who denied that Congress had the power to protect the civil rights of all persons
in the states were more willing to sign on to a federal law protecting the rights of
federal citizens. Following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, with its
Due Process Clause and its Section Five enforcement powers, Congress now had
express authority to protect all persons in their natural right to security in person
and property. This new grant of power allowed John Bingham to support the
reenactment of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, this time with language reflecting
Bingham's demand that Congress protect the basic due process rights of all per-
sons, not just citizens.
Understanding the 1866 Civil Rights Act as precursor to the Due Process
Clause, and not the Privileges or Immunities Clause, has significant implications
for scholarship on the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. To date,
scholars have almost universally assumed that the Civil Rights Act was an early
attempt to enforce the special privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. This assumption, in turn, has led numerous scholars to suppose that spe-
cific provisions granting equal protection to citizens under the Act, such as the
provision securing the right of citizens "to make and enforce contracts,"285 were
raised to the status of substantive (if constitutionally unenumerated) rights. The
historical record shows that this reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
both unduly narrow and unduly broad. It is unduly narrow in that the rights of the
285. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
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1866 Civil Rights Act were understood as belonging to all persons, and not just
citizens of the United States. It is unduly broad in that it wrongly transforms an
effort to ensure proper procedural protections for deprivations of life, liberty, and
property (for example, through the judicial enforcement of contracts) into an une-
numerated and unbounded set of substantive civil rights. However much radical
Republicans might have supported such an effort, it is clear that a majority of
Congress did not. These members insisted that proponents remove any language
from the Civil Rights Act that could conceivably be read as federalizing the sub-
stantive content of local civil rights.
Rather than representing an effort to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act and,
perhaps, transform the nature of rights granted equal protection under the Comity
Clause, it appears that the Privileges or Immunities Clause played a completely
different role. The man who drafted the Privileges or Immunities Clause, John
Bingham, described it as an effort to enforce enumerated constitutional rights
such as those declared in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. Evidence
supporting a due process reading of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and a civil rights
reading of the Due Process Clause seems to confirm John Bingham's understand-
ing of his own work.
Scholars remain divided about Bingham's understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and whether the text referred to constitutionally enumerated
rights. Much of this division, however, has been driven by the assumption that
Bingham must have understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause as enforcing
the 1866 Civil Rights Act. This Article disrupts that assumption and clears the
way for a new understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause-one that
distinguishes its protections from those afforded by the Civil Rights Act. One
possibility is that the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
involve a set of constitutionally enumerated rights-such as those listed in the
Bill of Rights-which had theretofore been ignored by the southern states and
which had lacked the guardianship of federal enforcement power. This was
Bingham's understanding of his handiwork and there is significant evidence that
this represents the public's understanding as well.
Regardless, the next generation of Fourteenth Amendment scholarship must
revise much of what prior scholars have assumed about the 1866 Civil Rights Act
and its relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act represents the first
congressional effort to enforce the rights of the Fourteenth Amendment. As such,
it stands as one of our master keys to understanding the original meaning of this
critical guardian of constitutional liberty. Getting the statute correct is an essential
first move toward understanding the special privileges of American citizens and
the fundamental rights of all persons.
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